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OUT OF THE SHADOWS: TRAVERSING THE IMAGINARY
OF SAMENESS, DIFFERENCE, AND RELATIONALISM -
A HUMAN RIGHTS PROPOSAL
Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol*
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history different visions of men and women have
evolved; from Aristotle to Aquinas, they have been deemed to exist in
"separate spheres."1 These different images are deeply embedded in
our psychology. They define our expectations about appropriate be-
havior of and locations for men and women in law and civil society.
One author captures this "different worlds" paradigm by suggesting
that men are from Mars and women are from Venus.2
In the separate spheres worldview, laws were made by men, for
men, about male things - public matters such as government and gov-
ernance. Women, on the other hand, were objects to be cared for
and protected by men. There was no pretense that equality consti-
tuted a desirable societal goal. Rather, there was an acceptance of
gendered inequality. In those days - and as this essay will suggest,
even still today - both natural law and positive law were deemed to
confirm the propriety of the separate spheres outcome.
Ample evidence exists of the embeddedness of the separate
spheres ideology in law. The Supreme Court, in its 1873 Bradwell v.
Illinois decision, was particularly forthcoming about embracing differ-
ence as a matter of law. Quoting the state court decision, the Court
plainly accepts the separate spheres ideology:
That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action,
and that it belonged to men to make, apply and execute the laws,
was regarded as an axiomatic truth.... In view of these facts, we are
certainly warranted in saying, that when the legislature gave to this
court the power of granting licenses to practice law, it was with not
the slightest expectation that this privilege would be extended
equally to men and women. 3
* Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of
Law. Many thanks to Jane Larson, Christy Gleason, Sharon Rush, Claire Moore Dick-
erson, and Christopher Slobogin for comments on early drafts, and to Shelbi Day
(UF2002) and Rebecca Di Concilio (UF2002) for excellent research assistance.
Muchisimas gracias to Cindy Zimmerman, computer wizard and editor
extraordinaire.
1. SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 9 (1989).
2. JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATION AND GETTING WHAT YOU WANT IN YOUR RELA-
TIONSHIP (1992).
3. In re Bradwell, 55 I11. 535, 539 (1869).
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The Court then proceeds to provide its own endorsement of men's
and women's separate and unequal geographies.
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a
wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and
woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender.
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life. The constitution of the family organization, which is founded
in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates
the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of
interest and views which belong, or should belong, to the family
institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct
and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed
was this sentiment in the founders of the common law that it be-
came a maxim of that system ofjurisprudence that a woman had no
legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her
head and representative in the social state ... a married woman is
incapable, without her husband's consent, of making contracts
which shall be binding on her or him.... The paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.4
The acceptance of the legal propriety of these separate spheres en-
dures in our imagination and everyday life in the early twenty-first
century.5
Psychology helps elucidate both the social acceptance and the
firm roots of these divergent and socially constructed gendered geog-
raphies. Dr. Martin Heesacker cleverly manipulates empirical data to
emphasize society's blind adherence to and approval of socially desig-
nated gender roles. He uses National Hurricane Center data6 that
show Atlantic hurricanes with male monikers have caused four times
4. Bradwe1 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
5. See United States v. Virginia, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2284 (1996) (holding that exclu-
sion of women from military college without existence of separate comparable pro-
gram for women effects denial of equal protection and noting that "'[I]nherent
differences' between men and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for
celebration but not for denigration of the members of either sex ..."); see also id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (lamenting the decision because "as to history: it counts for
nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of men's military colleges
supported by both states and the federal government"); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57 (1981) (rejecting Due Process challenge by men to the Military Selective Service
Act requiring men but not women to register because Congress could exclude women
from combat and thus men and women were not similarly situated); see also Sharon E.
Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
& L. 43-54 (1997) (discussing that gender classifications may legally be structured as
"separate but equal").
6. Martin Heesacker, Address at the University of Florida Levin College of Law
(Oct. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Heesacker Address]. Dr. Heesacker is the chair of the
Department of Psychology at the University of Florida, and set out those figures in a
slide presentation to the Law Faculty entitled "Gender and Emotion: Beliefs and
[Vol. 17:111
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as much damage as hurricanes with female names - $53 billion for the
six costliest male storms, compared to $13 billion for the six costliest
female storms 7 - to "prove" that boys hit harder than girls. He uses
similar data to "prove" that males kill more than females: since 1979,
5 storms with male names left more than 11,800 people dead, while
the 58 hurricanes with female names killed fewer than 100 persons.8
Only an already gendered world perception could render such data
credible evidence of real sex differences.
Leaving the meteorological data behind, and turning to data ob-
tained from psychological studies,9 Heesacker shows that men and wo-
men are not from different planets. Contrary to widely held
stereotypical sex-based beliefs about men's and women's differences
in emotional expressions, which consequently accounts for the credi-
bility and acceptability of the absurd use of data about storms to
"prove" sex differences, the empirical data derived from behavioral
studies reveals that men and women have no statistically significant
sex-based differences in emotional expression. This reality notwith-
standing, studies show that college students, rape counselors, crisis
counselors, and psychologists in accredited counseling center doc-
toral training sites all show "alpha bias" - the overestimation of sex
differences. 10 Thus, even trained professionals appear to internalize
the socially constructed, gendered, separate spheres.
Heesacker's conclusions could be interpreted as both contra-
dicting and confirming feminist discourses, particularly relationalism,
which as first articulated by Carol Gilligan"1 challenged the universal-
ity of male-based theories of moral development and life cycle models.
Gilligan debunked male normativity in moral development by identi-
fying the different axes on which men and women balance their
moral compass. She found that while men reach decisions in a linear
manner, with individual autonomy as a foremost consideration, wo-
men form their decisions in a relational manner - in the context of
the social institutions that are affected, including school and family. 12
Data." The data he uses were gathered since 1979 when the National Hurricane
Center began alternating male and female storm names.
7. Id. (citing GAINESVILLE SUN, Mar. 8, 2000).
8. Id. (citing Ken Kaye, 'Male' Hurricanes Pack a Deadlier Wallop, Statistics Show, S.
FL. SUN-SENTINEL, at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/weather/hurricane/sns-hc-
080100-malestorms.story).
9. Martin Heesacker et al., Gender-Based Emotional Stereotyping, 46 J. COUNSELING
PSYCHOL. 483 (1999) (reporting on findings from six follow-up studies to previous
studies conducted in 1999).
10. Heesacker Address, supra note 6 ("Research... suggests that people dramati-
cally overestimate the magnitude of emotional differences between men and women,
just as they often overestimate the magnitude of other sex differences, such as differ-
ences in math and language ability.").
11. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGIcAL THEORY & WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1993). Like Heesacker, Gilligan is a psychologist.
12. See id. at 21-22; see alsoJANE C. OLLENBURGER & HELEN A. MooRE, A SocIoL-
OGY OF WOMEN 17, 24-35 (1992) ("[M]ost women [and some men] construct knowl-
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These differences could be viewed as at odds with Heesacker's finding
of sameness of emotional expression. Yet, they comport with the idea
of an ingrained alpha bias.
Gilligan's work locates women in an "ethic of care" space in
which women focus on human interactions and relationships. 1 3 With
this outlook, "the moral dilemma changes from how to exercise one's
rights without interfering with the rights of others to how 'to lead a
moral life which includes obligations to [one's self and one's] family
and people in general."14 This "ethic of care" contrasts with men's
"ethic of rights," which comports with the classical autonomous indi-
vidual glorified in the liberal republican model.' 5
[W]hile [a male] subject worries about people interfering with each
other's rights, [a] woman worries about 'the possibility of omission,
of [her] not helping others when [she] could help them'....
Whereas the rights conception of morality that informs Kohlberg's
principled level.., is geared to arriving at an objectively fair or just
resolution to moral dilemmas upon which all rational persons could
agree, the responsibility conception focuses instead on the limita-
tions of any particular resolution and describes the conflicts that
remain .... [W]omen's process insist[s] [on] contextual relativ-
ism .... [It has a] greater orientation toward relationships and in-
terdependence [and] implies a more contextual mode ofjudgment
and a different moral understanding.' 6
It then becomes a challenge to reconcile Gilligan's conclusion
that men and women are different with Heesacker's empirical work
that seems to reveal sameness. Significantly, and arguably lending sup-
port to the separate ethic spheres addressed in Gilligan's work,
Heesacker observes that, when sex-based differences do occur in the
studies, they conform to the social stereotypes - "unjustifiable, fixed,
edge and decisions by integrating 'separate' [e.g., linear, authority-based] ways of
knowing with 'connected' [e.g., empathic, person-based] modes.").
13. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 62 ("An ideal of care is thus an activity of relation-
ship, of seeing and responding to need, taking care of the world by sustaining the web
of connection so that no one is left alone.").
14. Id. at 21.
15. To be sure, feminists have long critiqued the liberal model and even have
suggested that "to sign on to [a whole network of liberal concepts - rights, interests,
contracts, individualism, representative government, negative liberty] may be to ob-
scure rather than to illuminate a vision of politics, citizenship, and 'the good life'."
Mary G. Dietz, Context Is All: Feminism and Theories of Citizenship, DAEBALUs, Fall 1987,
at 4-5.
16. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 21-22. Kohlberg was a psychologist who early on
worked on moral development. In the research from which he derives his theory,
females are non-existent. The six stages in which he describes the "development of
moral judgment from childhood to adulthood are based empirically on a study of
eighty-four boys .... Id. at 18. Yet Kohlberg nevertheless "claims universality for his
stage sequence." Id. The "principled level" includes stages five and six which are
"geared to arriving at an objectively fair or just resolution to moral dilemmas." Id. at
21-22.
[Vol. 17:111
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usually standardized mental picture [s]" 17 of sex differences - of what
proper conduct for men and women is.18 Thus, one explanation of
men's and women's differences is alpha bias: the socially created and
constructed assumptions concerning gendered variances. Simply
stated, these separate spheres differences are socially imagined and
imposed. 19
While stereotypes can be both positive20 and negative, 21 they all
"have harmful repercussions when used to predict, judge, or under-
stand human behavior."22 One stereotype, which Heesacker reports
can be read as consistent with Gilligan's "ethic of care," 23 is the
"'global stereotype [that] implies that females experience and express
more emotion, more frequently, and with less self-control than males
do.' This stereotype about emotionality may result in harm for both
genders just as stereotypes have harmed individuals from various cul-
tures, races and sexual orientations. '24 The conformity of the differ-
ences to the socially constructed gendered behavioral norms does not
confirm sex differences as a reality; it simply "demonstrates the power
these stereotypes have to shape behavior."25
Significantly, both assumptions of difference and of sameness
have had deleterious consequences for women in the legal system.
Gender-stereotypical behaviors are rooted in culturally sanctioned
definitions and expectations of appropriate gender behavior which
permeate life and law.26 Stereotyping, deprivation of rights, and impo-
sition of private burdens without correlative benefits comprise, of
course, the complex that casts on women's existence the long shadow
of the law - a male-created, male-idealized, male-enforced normative
17. Heesacker et al., supra note 9, at 483.
18. Id.
19. Id.
[R]eview of research on both the private experience of emotion and on
men's and women's abilities to express various emotions ... concluded that
there were few consistent gender differences .... [One] study of facial ex-
pressions, speech, and visual behavior in response to affect-eliciting ques-
tions . . . concluded that measures of emotion 'failed to differentiate
between the sexes'.... 'There is no convincing body of evidence to support
the widely stated conclusion that women are more emotional than men'....
Id. Nor is there any evidence that would suggest "that men and women differ in their
confidence and ability to express or understand emotion." Id. at 484.
20. Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Critical Race Coalitions: Key Movements that Per-
formed the Theory, 33 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1377 (2000) (discussing "model minorities").
21. Alan Wolfe, The New Politics of Inequality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1999, at A27
(discussing "welfare queens").
22. Heesacker et al., supra note 9, at 483.
23. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 62-63.
24. Heesacker et al., supra note 9, at 483 (quoting R.A. Fabes & C.L. Martin,
Gender and Age Stereotypes of Emotionality, 1991 PERSONALITY & PSYCHOL. BULL. 532,
532).
25. Id. at 484.
26. See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Borders .(En)gendered: Nomativi-
ties, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 882, 911-18 (1997).
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structure. 27 As Heesacker's alpha bias reveals, highly trained psycholo-
gists - experts in the study of human behavior - are, notwithstanding
such training, imbued with, and unable to eschew, the biases effected
by social construction of gender. It then stands to reason that the
judges, legislators, arbitrators, mediators, and lawyers (whose sensitiv-
ity to, understanding or awareness of, and caring about human behav-
ior is not officially within their field of expertise) will be similarly
imbued with and unable to eschew gender bias.
These biases in law parallel what in psychology is called a "de-
structive therapeutic paradox"28 and which I will call in law a "destruc-
tive in/justice paradox." The paradox is grounded in the inherent
gendered nature and processes of the legal system which permit the
anomalous and abhorrent case outcomes that Victoria Nourse has de-
scribed 29 and call for the policy adjustments about which Mary Becker
has written. 30 But more than that, the destructive in/justice paradox
has put the brakes on all attempts at articulating a cohesive, coherent,
and universal feminist theory that could result in women's full per-
sonhood. The United Nations, no bastion of sex equality, has ac-
knowledged women's subordinated status in the home and at work, in
society and in government, at church and at school, regardless of
where in the world they are located.31 This inequality is social, politi-
cal, and economic.3 2 Global equality has been, and continues to be,
an elusive goal.
This work seeks to develop a methodology that serves a women's
anti-subordination project. To achieve this goal, Part II sets out the
theoretical background of feminist theory (II.A) and three waves of
27. Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and
the Workplace Debate, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 190 (D. Kelly Weisberg
ed., 1993); Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism, 1999
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAw 36 (1987).
28. Heesacker, supra note 9, at 492. Heesacker explains, with regards to an ex-
amination of studies on stereotypes of women, that
[i]t may be that these stereotypical beliefs regarding men's emotions both
reinforce and actually create limitations in people's functioning at the same
time mental health practitioners work to increase peoples functioning....
[T] here is [then] a potential for a 'destructive therapeutic paradox' because
individuals who do not conform to the perceived norm for their gender's
emotional behavior may actually be perceived by their counselors as more
psychopathological.
Id. (citation omitted).
29. See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Law's Constitution: A Relational Critique, 17 WIs.
WOMEN'S L.J. 23 (2002).
30. Becker, supra note 27; see also Mary Becker, Care and Feminists, 17 Wis. Wo-
MEN'S L.J. 57, 63, 109 (2002).
31. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1995, 2, 3 (1995) [hereinafter UNHDR 1995] ("In no society do women enjoy the
same opportunities as men.... [W]omen and men still live in an unequal world.").
32. Id. at 1 (noting that "the continuing exclusion of women from many eco-
nomic and political opportunities is a continuing indictment of modem progress").
[Vol. 17:111
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feminism (II.B). Part II.C articulates the feminist revelations about
law these analytical frameworks have engendered. These develop-
ments have failed to effect equality, but rather have exposed the de-
structive in/justice paradox. For example, sameness feminism is
grounded on the male normative, and has succeeded solely in grant-
ing women the rights men already have, only when women can show
they are the same as men. This is the feminism that has been the tiny
bitter pill of equality that the United States Supreme Court has man-
aged to swallow, although taking this route has opened no floodgate
of rights. On the other hand, difference feminism focuses on men's
and women's differences and suggests that those differences be ac-
commodated and that equal outcomes be nevertheless available. This
approach has not been embraced by courts, even though it makes in-
contestable sense, especially if one considers, for example, men's and
women's differences in reproductive functions (which have led to
vastly disparate productive market remunerations). Thus, regardless
of the viability of Heesacker's sameness or Gilligan's difference para-
digms, women have remained unequal to men.
In light of this depressing reality, my interest lies in redefining
equality from a woman-centered perspective. This endeavor is neces-
sary because we all - men and women alike, from most cultures, of all
races and abilities, colors and sexual orientations - exist in a world in
which our various and varied societies have fashioned images of what
is gender-appropriate behavior. This project sets out to craft a meth-
odology that can assist the goal of full personhood for women.
Women's full personhood is a substantive concept that, as de-
tailed in Part III, I ground on international human rights notions of
fundamental rights - rights that we have, or ought to have, because we
are human beings. Part III explores the breadth of the "rights con-
cept" in the human rights model which includes social, economic, and
cultural rights as well as civil and political rights. This is significant
because the human rights model affords us a broader spectrum than
does our domestic liberal model of what is fundamentally appropriate
and necessary for thriving as human beings - the essentials for the
fulfillment of the human spirit. Even the so-called civil and political
rights protections of the human rights paradigm are much more gen-
erous than the particular rights recognized in our local realm, such as
nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, and color. The human
rights version also protects rights ranging from language to social ori-
gin, from political beliefs to culture, from the individual to the family.
But beyond civil and political rights, human rights norms include
protection of economic rights of significance to women's full per-
sonhood. Thus, it allows me to urge the re-imaging of our local rights
to include, as fundamental, the right to work and to shelter, the right
to our families and their protection, the right to fair wages and
healthy working conditions - whether we are in the productive (mar-
ket) or reproductive phase of our lives. These rights will not all be
2002]
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present in full all at once perhaps, but they can be embraced as funda-
mental and progressively developed.
It is imperative to consider the economic location of women in
evaluating whether they are enjoying full personhood. That analysis
recognizes the violence of economic deprivation, 33 its gendered ori-
gins, and its disabling, devastating consequences.
In Part IV, to develop the methodology that aspires to full per-
sonhood for women, I draw from two theoretical models about inter-
national law-making: the communication theory,3 4 also known as the
New Haven School, and the legitimacy theory.35 Both theoretical
frameworks are of great utility in this equality project. To be sure, in
their original articulation, the concern of these theories is interna-
tional lawmaking. In Part IV, I take liberties with this original context
and adapt the frameworks to a reconceptualization of law for women.
Thus, as Parts III and IV set forth, this project draws from interna-
tional law for both process and substance.
In conclusion, this work suggests the first step towards women's
full personhood is to redesign our box, or better yet break out of it,
and eschew the "your rights/my rights" conceptualization of the lib-
eral tradition that has decimated women - the law that says pregnancy
is not sex related3 6 or insists that race and sex are divisible catego-
ries. 3 7 In its stead, we can adopt the basic premise of human rights
ideology that the plethora of rights recognized as fundamental to our
thriving as persons, necessary for our human dignity, are indivisible,
interdependent, and inviolable. In this regard, we move beyond the
"either/or" zero sum game approach to rights that drives the liberal
model, to a more communitarian, pluralistic approach that embraces
equality in difference.
II. WOMEN IN THE LAW
A. Theoretical Background
The historically and legally sanctioned "separate spheres" 38 ideol-
ogy has mandated that women spend their lives in the private sphere
of domestic life - home-making and childrearing - and is identified
with the family.39 In this system, women are assumed to be more rela-
33. Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Sex, Culture, and Rights: A Re/Conceptual-
ization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L. REv. 607, 627-32 (1997).
34. See infra Part IV.A.
35. See infra Part 1V.B.
36. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
37. DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), affd,
558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977); see generally Kimberl6 Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
(David Kairys ed., 3d ed., 1998).
38. OKIN, supra note 1.
39. Id. at 10; see also RADHIKA MOHANRAM, BLACK BODY 59 (1999) ("[W]ithin the
discourse of the nation, the woman is always configured only within the family.").
[Vol. 17:111
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tional and men more individualistic. 40 Yet, "all of our modern legal
theory . . . constitute 'the separation thesis', the assumption that
human beings, are definitionally distinct from each other."41 One
feminist critic has observed the irony in the law's atomistic approach
given that law in essence is about interactions between or among per-
sons: "It would also seem obvious that relational reasoning is law's
soul, that law's duty is to enhance, rather than to ignore, the rich di-
versity of life."'42
Because law regulates many activities in the public sphere but tra-
ditionally leaves the private sphere to individual control, much of wo-
men's lives has been outside the scope of protection of the legal rules
that govern the public sphere of men's existence. Given such struc-
tural inequalities, the liberal state, offering its citizenry a panoply of
negative rights - rights to be free from government interference - is
unable to effect gender equality because it leaves intact the status
quo.43 Liberal jurisprudence 44 created this equality trap by advocating
law which "masks the truth of gender stratification." 45
Feminist theory asked the "woman question" 46 which interrogates
how sex has influenced the development of societal structures and
40. Hilary Charlesworth, What are "Women's International Human Rights?", in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN 65 (RebeccaJ. Cook ed., 1994) (noting that the legal sys-
tem in the United States, and the legal systems worldwide, "privilege[ ] a male view of
the universe.... The language and the imagery of the law underscore its maleness: it
lays claim to rationality, objectivity, abstraction, characteristics traditionally associated
with men, and is defined in sharp contrast to emotion, subjectivity, and contextual-
ised thinking, the province of women.").
41. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1988) (bolster-
ing her theory of relationalism by claiming that "[w]omen are not essentially, necessa-
rily, inevitably, invariably, always, and forever separate from other human beings:
women, distinctively, are quite clearly 'connected' to another human life when
pregnant....").
42. Ann C. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373, 1387 (1986).
43. DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYoND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM, DECON-
STRUCTION, AND THE LAW 122-23 (1999) ("The structure of abstinence, more tradition-
ally called negative liberty, could only be legitimate if it were true that the genders
were actually equal. The social inequality of women means that the state must 'posi-
tively' intervene to wipe out the gender hierarchy.").
44. Id. at 122 (paraphrasing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THE-
ORY OF THE STATE, 161-62 (1989)) ("[Ironically,] the liberal state, with its system of
rights, serves as the ideology that now justifies the perpetuation of the social inequal-
ity it has purportedly overcome. The truth is the continuation of social inequality; the
ideology is that such inequality, if it exists at all, is marginal because it has been legally
erased.").
45. CORNELL, supra note 43, at 122.
46. See AUGUST BEBEL, Woman and Socialism, in Woman: Past, Present and Future
(Meta L. Sterm trans., 1918), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION
1600-PPESENT 86, 87 (John A. Maxwell & James J. Friedberg eds., 1994) ("[T] he wo-
men question demands our special consideration. What the position of woman has
been in ancient society, what her position is to-day and what it will be in the coming
social order, are questions that deeply concern at least one half of humanity.").
2002]
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norms and what impact the gendered nature of those developments
has had on women. Feminist legal inquiry has revealed that gender
bias is not an accident in the law and its structures, but rather a cen-
tral force in its development.47 In the international context, feminist
legal theory is used to analyze the structures - both substantive and
procedural norms as well as institutions - that exist in the interna-
tional realm and how those structures have marginalized women
within the international legal system. 48
Although feminist legal theory, like feminist theory, embraces va-
rying approaches and focal points, it underscores the deep schism
that exists between the law and the reality of women's lives. Domesti-
cally and internationally, this disconnect serves to explain why women
worldwide - regardless of race, class, ethnicity, nationality, religion,
marital status, color, ability, or social origin - exist at the margins of
society. In the twenty-first century, women are still viewed as wombs -
primarily in their reproductive roles, as second-class citizens, as vic-
tims, and as in need of protection in both times of war and peace.
Contrary to the reality of women's global inequality,49 the legal
norm worldwide is one of sex equality.50 Based upon this divide be-
tween legal rules and women's realities, feminist legal theory analyzes
how the law is complicit in women's subordination by masking
gendered norms as neutral and entrenching the status quo.51 Feminist
legal scholars focus on the reformation of law and legal structures;
unearth the locations that effect or preserve women's subordinated
status; question why they are persistent across time and cultures; and
work to change these manifestations in society, the law, and legal
systems.52
47. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 2 (1999)
("[G] ender bias constitutes a pervasive feature of our law, rather than merely repre-
senting isolated instances of abuse of law ... hav[ing] dissected legal doctrines and
the language of court opinions and statutes to find hidden mechanisms of discrimina-
tion and uncover the implicit hierarchies that are contained within a body of law.").
48. Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 613 (1991). Significantly, feminist legal theory is a very young discipline, dat-
ing only to the early 1970s. In the international realm, the feminist legal critique did
not emerge until 1991 with this Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright article.
49. See Part III.C. infra.
50. See infra notes 136, 155-65 and accompanying text.
51. CHAMALLAS, supra note 47, at 15 (suggesting and noting "male bias in rules,
standards, and concepts that appear neutral or objective on their face. . . . [such
i]mplicit male bias can be revealed by examining the real life impact of laws on wo-
men as a class, paying particular attention to how even noncontroversial legal con-
cepts and standards tend to disadvantage women" and that the "technique of tracing
out the gender implications of a social practice or rule is sometimes referred to as
asking 'the woman question' because it places women at the center of the inquiry,
even when the rule or practice in question appears to have little to do with gender").
52. See, e.g., Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist
Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1-2 (1987-88) (defining feminism as "the
range of committed inquiry and activity dedicated first, to describing women's subor-
dination - exploring its nature and extent; dedicated second, to asking both how -
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In the domestic sphere, the quest for transformation reaches sub-
stantive areas that range from economics (women's unpaid homemak-
ing or underpaid labor) to sex (sexuality or sexual exploitation such
as prostitution, rape, sexual harassment and domestic violence), from
motherhood and reproduction to welfare reform, abortion, and single
motherhood. 53 Domestic concerns also reach women's invisibility in
legal institutions in which law-making, law-interpreting, and law-en-
forcing takes place. Similarly, in the international sphere, the consid-
erations range from the absence of women in international
institutions to their absence in the "vocabulary of international law."5 4
B. Three Waves of Feminism
Feminist legal theory has experienced three waves: the sameness
or equality stage, the differences stage, and the anti-essentialism
stage. 55 As the analysis below shows, the three waves of feminism are
identified with various feminist models.
1. The First Wave
The first wave of feminism, the prevalent form of feminism in the
1960s and 1970s, was an "equality" stage.56 Also known as egalitarian
or bourgeois feminism, the theory "is grounded in the claims of the
classical liberal philosophy developed by Locke, Rousseau, Bentham
and Mill for equal rights, individualism, liberty and justice. '57
through what mechanisms, and why - for what complex and interwoven reasons -
women continue to occupy that position; and dedicated third, to change").
53. See CHAMALLAs, supra note 47, chs. 7-9.
54. HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 49 (2000).
Digging further down, many apparently 'neutral' principles and rules of in-
ternational law can be seen to operate differently with respect to women and
men. Another, deeper, layer of the excavation reveals the gendered and
sexed nature of the basic concepts of international law, for example, 'states',
'security', 'order' and 'conflict'. Permeating all stages of the dig is a silence
from and exclusion of women. This phenomenon does not emerge as a
simple gap or vacuum that weakens the edifice of international law and that
might be remedied by some rapid construction work. It is rather an integral
part of the structure of the international legal order, a critical element of its
stability. The silences of the discipline are as important as its positive rules
and rhetorical structures.
Id.
55. CHAMALLAS, supra note 47, at 23, 85-112 (calling the third wave a diversity
stage); Patricia Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: - Grounding the Theories, in FEMINIST LEGAL
THEORY: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 27, at 359-62 (calling the third wave a
postmodernist stage).
56. OLLENBURGER & MOORE, supra note 12.
57. SONYA ANDERMAHR ET AL., A CONCISE GLOSSARY OF FEMINIST THEORY 123
(1997); see also OLLENBURGER & MOORE, supra note 12, at 17 ("[Tlhe social ground-
work for this theory arose during the French Revolution and the Enlightenment in
Western Europe. These massive social changes provided both political and moral ar-
guments for the ideas of 'progress, contract, nature, and reason' that broke tradi-
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The liberal-feminist tradition dates to 1779 when Mary Woll-
stonecraft published A Vindication of Rights of Women positing, contrary
to the prevailing (male) liberal philosophers, "that women also halve]
the capacity to reason and, therefore, should have equal rights with
men."58 This approach identifies the root of women's second-class citi-
zenship as their lack of opportunity. 59 Consequently, the goal of lib-
eral feminism was to obtain equality for women by seeking equal
treatment in public life. 60
Liberal feminist jurisprudence focuses on the autonomy of the
individual 61 and insists that women, like men, are entitled to the free-
doms at the core of liberal theory such as "[r]ationality, individual
choice, equal rights and equal opportunity."62 Rather than challenge
existing social, economic, and political rules and structures of demo-
cratic societies, 63 liberal feminists argue that women, just like men,
ought to have access to the protection of the rules and membership in
the structures.6 4 The principal aspiration of legal liberal feminists is to
obtain equality of men and women in the public sphere - an appro-
priate goal if Heesacker's sameness analysis is correct. This includes
tional social ties and norms. The assumption is that if women are allowed equal
access to compete, they will succeed." [citation omitted]).
58. OLLENBURGER & MOORE, supra note 12, at 17-18 (noting that Harriet Taylor's
The Enfranchisement of Women and John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women, which
addressed the equal ability of women, are other influential texts in liberal feminism).
See generally JOSEPHINE DONOVAN, FEMINIST THEORY - THE INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS
OF AMERICAN FEMINISM (1985).
59. OLLENBURGER & MOORE, supra note 12, at 17 (observing that "the cause of
women's oppression is identified as their individual or group lack of opportunity and
education").
60. JUDITH LORBER, GENDER INEQUALITY: FEMINIST THEORIES AND POLITICS 19
(1998); see also OLLENBURGER & MOORE, supra note 12, at 17 ("[T]he solution for
change is for women to gain opportunities primarily through the institutions of edu-
cation and economics .. ").
61. Becker, supra note 27. Liberal feminism, also known as egalitarian or bour-
geois feminism, "is grounded in the claims of the classical liberal philosophy devel-
oped by Locke, Rousseau, Bentham and Mill for equal rights, individualism, liberty and
justice." Berta E. Hernfindez-Truyol, Crossing Borderlands of Inequality with International
Legal Methodologies - A Plea for Multiple Feminisms, in GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (forthcoming 2002) (quoting ANDERMAHR ET AL., supra note 57, at 123).
See also OLLENBURGER & MOORE, supra note 12, at 17; note 58 supra.
62. Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 27, at 237; see also Patricia Smith, Feminist Jurisprudence and
the Nature of Law, in FEMINISTJURISPRUDENCE 3, 4-5 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993) ("The
view of liberal feminists, whether classical or modern, is still that the solution to the
oppression of women is to provide equal opportunity for all."); CHARLESWORTH &
CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 38-39.
63. CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM xx (Zillah R.
Eisenstein ed., 1979) [hereinafter CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY] (suggesting flaw in idea
"that women's liberation can be fully achieved without any major alterations to the
economic and political structures of contemporary capitalist democracies").
64. CHAMALLAS, supra note 47, at 25; CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 54, at
38-39.
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equal opportunity to participate in, be represented in, and be a repre-
sentative in politics as well as equal market access to jobs, services, and
education.65
A limitation of liberal feminist legal theory is its emphasis on simi-
larities between men and women. Under such a paradigm, women
are only deemed to be entitled to rights if they are "similarly situated"
to men,66 which requires women "to conform to a male-defined
world" if they want to obtain rights. 67 Notwithstanding this limitation,
the equality model is the one that courts in the United States 68 and
Europe 69 have embraced in analyzing sex discrimination claims. In
contrast, Canada has taken an approach that considers inequality,70
and South Africa's new constitution also appears to take gender ine-
qualities into consideration, focusing on unfairness rather than same-
ness.71 Notwithstanding the limitations of liberal feminism, both
domestically and internationally, it has facilitated women's advance-
ment when their location - educationally or experientially - has al-
lowed them to be favorably compared to men.
2. The Second Wave
The second wave of feminism, in the vein of the Gilligan model
discussed earlier, focused on the differences between men and wo-
men. 72 As de Beauvoir had done three decades earlier, 73 Catharine
MacKinnon powerfully articulated the idea behind difference legal
65. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 39 (noting, about legal liberal
feminists, that "[t]heir primary goal is to achieve equality of treatment between wo-
men and men in public areas such as political participation and representation and
equal access to and equality within paid employment, market services and educa-
tion"); CHtAMALLAs, supra note 47, at 23, 31-46; Cain, supra note 55, at 359-60.
66. Cain, supra note 62, at 238 ("If members of the dominant gender [men]
enjoy rights that members of the nondominant gender [women] want, then the only
way for women to obtain these rights under existing equal protection doctrine is to
argue that, as to the right in question, women are similarly situated to men."); see also
Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist Theoretical Approaches to Child Custody and
Same-Sex Relationships, 23 STETSON L. Rv. 701, 704 (1994).
67. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 39.
68. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (concluding that gender-based
differential regarding legal age for drinking beer is denial of equal protection).
69. CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEX EQUALrrY 35-37 (2001).
70. Id. at 24-26; see e.g., R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.R. 452 (Can.).
71. MACKINNON, supra note 69, at 41.
72. CHAlA.s, supra note 47, at 23, 47-62; Cain, supra note 55, at 360-62; Cain,
supra note 62, at 239 (noting that difference feminism -emphasizes the differences
between men and women); ANDERMAHR ET AL., supra note 57, at 39.
73. Simone de Beauvoir described women as the "other" and provided a compre-
hensive account of the location of women in society in the western world.
Thus humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative
to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being.... She is defined and
differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is
the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject,
he is the Absolute - She is the Other.
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feminism: the maleness of norms that pose as neutral. MacKinnon
observed that
virtually every quality that distinguishes men from women is already
affirmatively compensated in this society. Men's physiology defines
most sports, their needs define auto and health insurance coverage,
their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations
and successful career patterns, their perspectives and concerns de-
fine quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions define
merit, their objectification of life defines art, their military service
defines citizenship, their presence defines family, their inability to
get along with each other - their wars and rulerships - defines his-
tory, their image defines god, and their genitals define sex."4
Difference feminism, which emerged in the 1970s, 75 emphasizes
that gendered oppression is structural, 76 and that structural gendered
ordering is socially constructed and not naturally or biologically pre-
ordained. Difference feminism reveals that existing biased norms and
institutions simply serve to perpetuate the status quo and to entrench
the existing inequalities. 77
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX Xviii-XiX (Knopf ed., 1993) (1953). Octavio
Paz, the 1990 winner of the Nobel Prize in Literature, presenting the Mexican man's
conception of "woman," provides a similar sentiment: "the Mexican considers woman
as an instrument of male desires and of the ends assigned to her by morality, society,
and the law .... In a world made in man's image, woman is only a reflection of
masculine will and desire .... Womanhood, unlike manhood, is never an end in
itself." OCTAVIO PAZ, EL LABERINTO DE LA SOLEDAD Y OTRAS OBRAS [THE LABYRINTH OF
SOLITUDE AND OTHER WORKS] 57 (1993). De Beauvoir's social critique unveiled
norms and values that are far from neutral, and are male-defined. Men's dominance
and women's subordination became understood as a social construction and not bio-
logical determinism. LORBER, supra note 60, at 3; see also DE BEAUVOIR, supra, at xix.
74. MACKINNON, supra note 27 (citation omitted).
75. CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY, supra note 63, at xx (holding "that gender oppres-
sion is the oldest and most profound form of exploitation, which predates and under-
lies all other forms including those of race and class" and sexuality as well as other
oppressions); ANDERMAHR ET AL., supra note 57, at 182 (noting "[t]hat male oppres-
sion has primacy over all other oppressions, for which indeed it provided the tem-
plate"). See also LORBER, supra note 60, at 65 (noting that this feminist outlook
addresses "a system of men's oppression of women (patriarchy) that goes beyond dis-
crimination [and includes] men's violence and control of women through rape, bat-
tering and murder"); OLLENBURGER & MOORE, supra note 12, at 21; ANDERMAHR ET
AL., supra note 57, at 182 ("[W] omen are oppressed as women and that their oppres-
sors are men. Male power had to be recognized and understood, and was not to be
reduced to anything else, for example, the power of capital over labour.").
76. LORAER, supra note 60, at 65 (focusing on "legitimation of women's oppres-
sion in law, medicine, religion, and other social institutions[; the] objectification of
women's bodies in advertisements, mass media, and cultural productions[; and the]
sexual exploitation in pornography and prostitution").
77. See Becker, supra note 66, at 708 (describing MacKinnon's critique of formal
equality in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 101-
41 (1979)) (noting that while "formal equality may look gender-neutral, ... in appli-
cation it is androcentric, centered on male needs and male-defined standards because
it only applies when women look like men (thus similarly situated) and even then
only entitles these women to the rules and practices worked out by men for men").
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Difference feminism recognizes that, in some respects, women
and men are not similarly situated, most notably in their reproductive
functions. A pregnant woman can never be equally positioned to a
nonexistent pregnant man. Thus, absent a difference standard, a
pregnant woman's rights can be denied because of the male normativ-
ity of rules and standards. 78 Beyond reproductive capacity, the discus-
sions on women's real differences within the legal system have
centered on "the feminization of poverty, the gender gap in politics,
the 'glass ceiling,' and other phenomena which made it clear that, in
many ways that mattered, men and women were different. '79
Much like Gilligan's model, in the legal realm cultural or rela-
tional feminism critiques the maleness of law.80 It "articulates the ways
women often tend[ ] to approach problems, view the world, and con-
struct their identity."8 1 Cultural feminism seeks to debunk sex roles
and gendered social and legal assumptions in order for law to reflect
women's realities,8 2 to confront the gendered social order, and to
turn patriarchy on its head by reclaiming the devalued feminine traits
78. Cain, supra note 55, at 360 ("Once women began to be treated like men,
people began to notice that women really are not like men. Women are most notice-
ably not like men when they are pregnant.").
79. CHAMAL.LAS, supra note 47, at 25.
80. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 40-41.
[L]aw privileges a male view of the universe and that law is part of the struc-
ture of male domination. The hierarchical organisation of law, its adversarial
format and its aim of the abstract resolution of competing rights, makes the
law an intensely patriarchal institution. Law thus represents a very limited
aspect of human experience. The language and imagery of the law under-
score its maleness; it lays claim to rationality, objectivity and abstractness,
characteristics traditionally associated with men, and is defined in contrast to
emotion, subjectivity and contextualised thinking - the province of women.
Id.
81. CiL mst..S, supra note 47, at 27; Cain, supra note 62, at 241. Interestingly, in
legal theory, as contrasted to the social sciences, cultural feminists ignore the lesbian
experience. See also Cain, supra note 55, at 361.
82. Cain, supra note 62, at 241.
Using equality rhetoric, cultural feminists argue for material changes in pre-
sent conditions that would support woman-valued relationships.... A prop-
erly constructed feminist jurisprudence would reflect the reality of women's
lives - their essential connectedness.... Martha Fineman, for example, has
argued for a concept of equality that recognizes and values the special rela-
tionship between mother and child. Similarly, Robin West has charged that
all modern legal theory is 'masculine' because it is based on a view of human
beings as primarily distinct and unconnected to each other.
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as positive and desirable.8 3 Because cultural feminism focuses on wo-
manhood,8 4 it has been criticized as essentialist.8 5
Relationalism reveals the structural nature of "targeted
inequalities":
1. Cultural overvaluation of masculine qualities and undervaluation
of feminine qualities. 2. Cultural focus on men and male needs with
the tendency not to see women as fully human and to be oblivious
to women's needs. 3. Insistence that men and women are essentially
different and that men play masculine roles and women play femi-
nine roles.86
Professor Becker's "approach challenges cultural values that generate
inequalities. 8s7 She posits that valuable traits ought to be valued re-
gardless of their being denominated male or female and regardless of
who displays the traits.88 Ultimately, she urges that "community, rela-
tionships, and traditionally feminine qualities should be valued more
and traditionally male qualities should be valued less."89 Thus, rela-
tional feminism specifically focuses on the premise that men and wo-
men should have equal opportunities for human happiness and
fulfillment,90 conforming with what I call in this work the goal of full
personhood for women. Pursuant to such an approach, women's val-
ues and approaches will be accepted and valued in public life and civil
society.
3. The Third Wave
The third wave centrally critiques gender essentialism 9' - "the
idea that there is some common, underlying attribute or experience
83. ANDERMAHR ET AL., supra note 57, at 38 (explaining that this desirable wo-
men's culture includes "mothering;.'.. spirituality;... language;... lesbianism and
'woman-relatedness';... moral reasoning;... the Greenham Common women's peace
movement;... male violence against women;... pornography;... [and] utopian
literature").
84. Id. at 39.
85. Id.; see id. at 82 (quoting Teresa de Laurentis, The Essence of the Triangle, or
Taking the Risk of Essentialism Seriously: Feminist Theory, in Italy, the U.S. and Britain, in
DIFFERENCES: A JOURNAL OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUDIES 1, 2, 3-37 (Naomi Schor &
Elizabeth Weed eds., 1989)) (defining essentialism as "... the indispensable and nec-
essary attributes of a thing as opposed to those which it may have or not").
86. Becker, supra note 27, at 46-49, tbl. A.
87. Id.
88. See also ANDERMAHR ET AL., supra note 57, at 182 ("[T]he whole gender order
in which people, things and behaviour are classified in terms of the distinction be-
tween masculine and feminine is socially constructed and has no basis in natural dif-
ferences between the sexes. A common goal was 'the annihilation of sex-roles'...
see id. at 39 (origins of phrase "annihilation of sex-roles").
89. Becker, supra note 27, at 46-49, tbl. A.
90. Id.
91. KATHARINE T. BARTLETT & ANGELA P. HARMis, GENDER AND THE LAw: THEORY,
DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 1007 (1998).
Gender essentialism has been identified as more than one thing, as a grab
bag of different, sometimes overlapping problems. One is the problem of
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shared by all women, independent of race, class, sexual orientation, or
other aspects of their particular situation." 92 This wave rejects general
and universal categorizations of women as falsely and inappropriately
homogenizing. For example, women of color within predominantly
white societies, and lesbians within predominantly heterosexual socie-
ties, expose the flaw of essentialism: the impossible task of separating
integral parts of identity - race and sex, gender, and sexuality. Hence,
anti-essentialists propose a both/and rather than an either/or ap-
proach. 93 Nonessentialist feminisms include third world or develop-
ment feminism, women of color feminism,94 and postmodern
feminism.
Third world or development feminism focuses on the impact on
women of economic development in postcolonial societies. 95 It shows
false universalism, in which the unstated sometimes unconscious assumption
that for purposes of feminism 'women' are white, middle-class, heterosexual,
able-bodied, and otherwise privileged. A second.., problem... has to do
with the applicability of Western feminism to other cultures.
Id. Other essentialisms include
reductionism by which the world is viewed through a single lens that reduces
social relations to those aspects that support one 'grand' theory... [;] select-
ing out only one possible source of a woman's identity - such as her gender,
race, class, or sexual preference - and treating it as severable from the rest of
her being ... [; the 'naturalist' error [that] assume[s] the existence of cer-
tain inherent or 'natural' facts, rather than socially constructed ones, on
which the law is or should be based... [;] the ... problem.., of categoriza-
tion . .. [in a world in which] every category is inevitably underinclusive or
overinclusive . .. [; and] a seventh connotation of the term 'essentialism'
points toward . . . 'postmodernism' . . . [which] challenges the notion that
there is any objective reality 'out there' in the world that can be perceived
apart from our expectations and our past experiences.
Id. at 1008-09; see also CHAMALLAS, supra note 47, at 87 (noting that "[a] second form
of gender essentialism [is] 'gender imperialism' or 'gender primacy' [and it] makes
the mistake of according too much weight to gender oppression, minimizing the im-
pact of oppression based on race, class, or sexual orientation").
92. CHAmALs, supra note 47, at 86.
93. See Kimberl Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990); Cain, supra note 55; see generally Herndndez-
Truyol, supra note 26.
94. See LORBER, supra note 60, at 45-59; 133-47 (noting third wave feminism and
feminism of women of color are strands that could be addressed separately); see also
Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, Las Olvidadas-Gendered in Justice/Gendered Injustice - La-
tinas, Fronteras, and the Law, I J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 355 (1998) (indicating that
given the lower incomes, educational attainment, health profiles, and political repre-
sentation of women of color in industrialized states, they effectively constitute a third
world within a first world and thus could be considered under some precepts of third
world feminism).
95. LORBER, supra note 60, at 46 ("Development feminism uses theories of colo-
nial underdevelopment and post-colonial development, as well as Marxist and social-
ist feminist theories, to analyze the position of women in the global economy, with
particular emphasis on newly industrializing countries.").
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that economic exploitation of women in developing states, particu-
larly as exacerbated by globalization, is "greater than in developed
economies."96 Development feminism also engages the issue of wo-
men's rights and cultural traditions, such as child marriage, female
genital cutting, dowry, and bride killing. This conflict raises the issue
of the relativism versus universality of rights97 - interrogating whether
the condemnation of cultural practices that are harmful to women is
an imperialistic western move that eviscerates minority cultural
traditions.
Women of color feminism, or multiracial feminism, emphasizes
the multidimensional nature of discrimination. Furthermore, it
reveals how, notwithstanding the reality that across groups women are
always more disadvantaged than men,98 multiple otherness - being
not only a woman but also belonging to an ethnic, sexual, racial, gen-
der, and/or class minority - effects and exacerbates the marginaliza-
tion and subordination of women. 99 Women of color feminisms are
varied, reflecting the diverse political, cultural, intellectual, and eco-
nomic struggles that the different groups and individuals within those
groups' experience. 100 But there are commonalities as these multira-
cial feminisms all focus on the interlocking multiple systems of domi-
nation that render the categories of "man" and "woman" insufficient
96. Id. For example, women are paid less than men whether they work in facto-
ries or are paid for work done in the home, continuing the gendered division of labor
that resulted from colonization, while still being expected to care for families and the
home. Id. at 53-54.
Development feminism equates women's status with their contribution to
their family's economy and their control of economic resources.... Devel-
opment feminism's theory is that in any society, if the food or income wo-
men produce is the main way the family is fed, and women also control the
distribution of any surplus they produce, women have power and pres-
tige.... When a woman is able to own the means of production [land, a
store, a business] like a man, she has the chance to be economically inde-
pendent. If her income is barely above subsistence level because her choices
are low-waged work in a factory, piece work in a sweatshop, or sex work as a
prostitute, then the fact that she has ajob does not give her a very high social
status, especially if much of the money she earns is sent back home to her
family.
Id.
97. See Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol, Women's Rights as Human Rights - Rules, Reali-
ties and the Role of Culture: A Formula for Reform, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 605 (1996);
ALISON D. RENTELN, FRONTIERS OF ANTHROPOLOGY: INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS
(1990).
98. Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, Building Bridges - Latinas and Latinos at the Cross-
roads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 369 (1994)
[hereinafter Building Bridges]; Hernndez-Truyol, supra note 97.
99. See Hernqndez-Truyol, supra note 97; LORBER, supra note 60, at 134; see gener-
ally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM (Adrien K Wing ed., 1997).
100. See generally GLOBAL CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER
(Adrien K. Wing ed., 2000) [hereinafter GLOBAL]; see also LORBER, supra note 60, at
136 (excerpt from Maxine B. Zinn & Bonnie T. Dill, Theorizing Dfferences from Multira-
cial Feminism, 22 FEMINIST STUD. 321 (1996)).
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to evaluate the condition of women of color.10 1 The focus of these
discourses includes cultural differences, eradication of poverty, global-
ization, and, in the international context, the differential concerns be-
tween poor and rich nations.
Postmodern feminism' 0 2 contests the existence of any objective
reality' 03 and rejects that "categorical, abstract theories derived
through reason and assumptions about the essence of human nature
can serve as the foundation of knowledge. ' 10 4 To postmodernists,
there can be no single truth; 10 5 rather, all truths are linked to and
bound by a person's experience, which is wholly dependent upon that
person's position in the world. 10 6 Consequently, the liberal and differ-
ence feminist inquiries about the issues of sameness or difference are
irrelevant to the postmodern feminist inquiry because these dichoto-
101. LORBER, supra note 60, at 138-39. Lorber noted distinguishing characteris-
tics of multiracial feminism:
First, multiracial feminism asserts that gender is constructed by a range of
interlocking inequalities, what Patricia Hill Collins calls a 'matrix of domina-
tion'. ... Second, multiracial feminism emphasizes the intersectional nature
of hierarchies at all levels of social life. Class, race, gender, and sexuality are
components of both social structure and social interaction.... Third, multi-
racial feminism highlights the relational nature of dominance and subordi-
nation. Power is the cornerstone of women's differences. . . . Fourth,
multiracial feminism explores the interplay of social structure and women's
agency. Within the constraints of race, class, and gender oppression, women
create viable lives for themselves, their families, and their communities....
Fifth, multiracial feminism encompasses wide-ranging methodological ap-
proaches, and like other branches of feminist thought, relies on varied theo-
retical tools as well. . . . Sixth, multiracial feminism brings together
understandings drawn from the lived experiences of diverse and continu-
ously changing groups of women. Among Asian Americans, Native Ameri-
cans, Latinas, and Blacks are many different national cultural and ethnic
groups. Each one is engaged in the process of testing, refining, and re-
shaping these broader categories in its own image.
Id. (citations omitted).
102. ANDERMAHR ET AL., supra note 57, at 170 (noting that "[i]t is not easy to
attach the postmodernist label with any degree of confidence to feminist thinkers").
103. Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DuKEJ. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 14 (1994).
The postmodern view of the individual or the 'legal subject' opposes the
Enlightenment view of the stable, coherent, and rational self with a more
complicated view of the individual as 'constituted' from multiple institu-
tional and ideological forces that, in various ways, overlap, intersect and even
contradict each other. Although these forces join to produce a reality that
the individual subject experiences as real or true, it is in fact a reality or truth
that is 'constructed'.
Id.
104. Smith, supra note 62, at 6.
105. Id. at 5 (noting that "for postmodern feminists there is no single solution
and no single oppression of women, but only solutions tailored to the concrete expe-
rience of actual people").
106. Cain, supra note 62, at 242 ("Postmodern feminists eschew the idea of uni-
tary truth, of objective reality. They readily admit that categories, especially gender
categories, are merely social constructs. Equality, too, is a social construct.").
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mies "are illusions caused by the flawed structural frameworks that
generate them." 10 7
The postmodern perspective of asking a complex "woman ques-
tion" in a nonuniversalized and nonessentialized manner - a philoso-
phy that it shares with the third world feminists and feminists of color
- recognizes the reality that
law.., does not operate in a monolithic way to oppress women and
advantage men. There are many different voices and experiences
and realities unreflected in the law .... Post-modern feminism is
concerned with the specific operation of the law and the particular
contexts of women. This approach emphasises the utility of action
at the micro-political level rather than the uncertain path of law
reform. 10
8
In sum, as the existence of the various and varied feminisms dis-
cussed above suggests, no one system can be constructed nor one the-
ory crafted that can address all structural gender deficiencies of the
existing social and legal systems. Thus, as this work also suggests, ask-
ing the "woman question"10 9 requires a more complex analytical con-
struct that can accommodate different women's lived realities.
Perhaps today, we should more appropriately call this process the ask-
ing of the "human question."
C. Feminist Revelations: Openings Towards Full Personhood
Feminists have exposed the law as created by and constructed
from a masculine viewpoint.' 10 Yet, in order to maintain its legitimacy
107. Smith, supra note 62, at 8.
108. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 45; see generally CRITICAL RACE
FEMINISM, supra note 99; GLOBAL, supra note 100; Building Bridges, supra note 98 (not-
ing the multidimensionality of multiple others).
109. See AuGuST BEBEL, supra note 46; Herndndez-Truyol, supra notes 26, 94, 97;
Building Bridges, supra note 98; Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol, Latinas, Culture and Human
Rights: A Model for Making Change, Saving Soul 23 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 21 (2001); see
also Cain, supra note 62, at 243.
110. MACKINNON, supra note 44, at 161-62.
The state is male in the feminist sense: the law sees and treats women the
way men see and treat women. The liberal state coercively and authorita-
tively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a gender -
through its legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive
policies. The state's formal norms recapitulate the male point of view on the
level of design.
Id.; see also CORNELL, supra note 43, at 122.
We no longer see the so-called objective perspective as the one legitimated
because it is the expression of masculinity. To enforce law, as currently de-
fined, then, is to reinforce the male viewpoint, in spite of law's claim to do
the exact opposite. The so-called liberal state is only the rule of men, but
now even more dangerous to feminist politics because it is disguised as the
rule of law, with its legitimate claim on all of us, because it supposedly offers
us equal respect for persons. Better to recognize the struggle, the politics,
that this rule of law seems to make invisible.
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and its universality, the law must deny that such a "hierarchical stratifi-
cation between the genders" exists.111 The law is "lying" when it claims
to have erased gender inequality.1 12 While the erasure may have
taken place in books, women's reality is one of inequality.
In this system, based on individualism (sameness) and gendered
separate spheres (difference), when women cannot be the same as
men, they are unable to enjoy equality. In the real world, the individ-
ualistic, atomistic rights-based model is male normative and does not
reflect women's experiences of interaction, communication, contextu-
alization, and relationship. Feminist theories critique these outcomes.
The male-normativity of the law itself constitutes the idea (and
ideal) of citizenship. The law's objects - the "reasonable men"113 -
are the norm; thus, generating the idea of the citizen as gendered
male. 114 The legal person that has emerged in this liberal tradition is
both male and male-identified. 115
The maleness of the law obscures women;"16 it effects a loss of
agency and a devaluation of their natural characteristics. 117 A wo-
man's different voice - her different approach to and resolution of
moral dilemmas - is typically, but erroneously, characterized as naive
and immature, 18 as contrasted to the more evolved linear (male)
process.
Part of the difficulty in criticizing our current law as masculine is
the problematics of men's and women's realities. To be sure, in some
Id.
111. CORNELL, supra note 43, at 121.
112. Id.
113. Joanne Conaghan, Tort Law and the Feminist Critique of Reason, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAw 47, 55 (Anne Bottomley et al.
eds., 1996) [hereinafter FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES] (noting that, considering Carol Gilli-
gan's work, "the standard implicit in the reasonable man test, with its emphasis on
abstract cost benefit calculations, corresponds more closely with the 'male' than the
'female' voice" (citation omitted)); see also Stephanie Palmer, Critical Perspectives on
Women's Rights: The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 223, 225 ("[Other f]eminists have also convincingly
illustrated that the ostensibly universal category of 'individual' suggested by liberal
theorists is constructed on the basis of male attributes. The liberal legal world ignores
the gender inequalities which are built into the very definition of the system. Men
and women cannot compete if the gender neutral rules are established to suit the
apparent interests and needs of a man's world." (citation omitted)).
114. MoHANRA, supra note 39, at 58.
115. CORNELL, supra note 43, at 121.
116. MoHANRAm, supra note 39, at 83 ("[T]he woman's body functions as a medi-
ator for the male citizens to experience the landscape and the nation as nurturing,
comforting and familiar. Given that her body functions to mediate the connection
between the male citizen and nation, a female citizen cannot experience the national
landscape in an identical way to her male counterpart, in that her body functions to
nurture him.").
117. Id. at 59 (noting that woman's "role is marginalized in that she is located as
devoid of agency as a 'woman within the nation', though she might gain access into
the nation from within the context of race, class, sexuality, age, etc.").
118. GILLIGAN, supra note 11, at 17-23;.see also OKuN, supra note 1.
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contexts - such as humanity and intellect for example - women can
be compared to men. That is, men and women are, or can be, the
"same."'119 Yet, there are contexts in which men and women are dif-
ferent. 20 The quintessential example is reproductive capacity and
function. Moreover, not all women are the same; "women" is not a
homogeneous category. Rather, ethnic, racial, sexual, class, linguistic,
religious, and other differences render the category of women a com-
plex, heterogeneous one. The challenge in the framework of women's
lives of real, rather than imagined or fabricated, differences is to cre-
ate a structure so that all women can enjoy full personhood, even in
light of such inter- and intra-gender variances.
It is noteworthy, however, that the model of men's and women's
equality that has been adopted by the Supreme Court is the sameness
model. 12 1 Under this view of equality, the problem is
defined primarily in terms of discrimination but within an accepted
male-dominated context. The discrimination standard demands a
comparison of the victim's treatment with the 'normal', that is,
male, standard. There is no avenue for challenging the accepted
criteria; the successful argument is based on assimilation, on equal-
ity with men. Disadvantages suffered by women are redressed by
equal treatment and the value of any specifically female life exper-
iences is inevitably marginalised. The difficulty is that equality is
promised only to those women who can conform to a male model.
This approach... assumes 'a world of autonomous individuals start-
ing a race or making free choices [which] has no cutting edge
against the fact that men and women are simply running different
races'.122
Heesacker's studies in psychology 23 as well as postmodern femi-
nists124 suggest that, other than in the biological differences context,
male and female differences are largely socially constructed. Thus,
Heesacker's findings suggest that, once society can rid itself of its al-
119. See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text for discussion of "sameness"
feminist theory.
120. See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text for discussion of "difference
feminism."
121. CORNELL, supra note 43, at 137 (the current Supreme Court thinks of equal-
ity as women being like men, "the empirical demonstration that we are the same as
they are for purposes of a particular case").
122. Palmer, supra note 113, at 234-35 (quoting N. Lacey, Legislation Against Sex
Discrimination: Questions from a Feminist Perspective, 14J.L. Soc'y 411, 420 (1987)).
123. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (setting forth notions of
postmodern feminism); see also CORNELL, supra note 43, at 137 ("The wrong in sex
discrimination under this view of equality is that a universal, female identity is being
wrongly imposed on women to whom it does not directly apply. All women are as-
sumed to be alike and, then, different from men. The wrong of discrimination, in
other words, is the imposition of the universal on the particular, on an individual who
does not fit the generalization.").
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pha biases,1 25 the sameness model could work. 126 This outcome would
accommodate some feminist critics. For example, Gilligan's "ethic of
care" suggests that "[w] omen think in relational terms because [their]
existence is defined in relation to men."1 27 Thus, once women's exis-
tence is not derivative, sameness equality notions may provide the nec-
essary protections for attainment of full personhood for women.
However, it would not satisfy critics of both the sameness and differ-
ence approaches, who note that both are male-centered and thus priv-
ilege the male values and power that have served to define
womanhood.1 28
After many years of theorizing, it is plain that no single model has
succeeded in advancing women's lot in society, family, work, or law.
This is not difficult to explain really. At times, women can be evalu-
ated on the basis of a sameness norm, such as work criteria, and do
fine; yet at other times, a sameness model is inadequate because wo-
men, such as in matters related to pregnancy or in matters concerning
multiple others, are not, and cannot be, the "same" as the normative
male. While some differences are real, many are imaginary, grounded
in socially constructed views and expectations of outcomes - based on
stereotypes.1 29 These constructed differences, however, have served in
125. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
126. See KIRSTEIN AMUNDSEN, THE SILENCED MAJORITY 142 (1971) ("The personal-
ity characteristics associated with proper femininity and manliness are arbitrarily as-
signed to each sex without regard to the very complex and wide-ranging differences
inherent in the members of both. There are men who find it very difficult to be
strong, independent, and aggressive, just as there are women who develop such attrib-
utes with comparative ease."). For more information on gender differences in moral
reasoning, see CORNELL, supra note 43, at 135.
127. MACKINNON, supra note 27, at 39.
128. See, e.g., CORNELL, supra note 43, at 126.
For MacKinnon, the celebration of female difference is part of the same old
story and therefore, not about difference at all. Women may value relations
of care more than men; they may be less oriented to rights rhetoric; they
may be more emphatic. But if they are, MacKinnon would insist that they
are so as an expression of what men have made them to be. Very simply put,
what has been shoved down our throats cannot be valued because this is the
way women are, which is not to say that MacKinnon does not recognize that
there might be a purportedly 'independent' ethical argument for these val-
ues that are associated with women's reality. But such an argument would
have to justify these values independently of empirical claims about what
Women are. What we are is oppressed, our 'values,' a reflection of that
oppression.
Id. at 133 (observing that "[f]or MacKinnon, what women desire now under patri-
archy is by definition false consciousness. So we think that we want love and intimacy?
For MacKinnon, we only think that way because that's how they want and need us to
think so that we will continue to be available to them. Women's expressed desire is
only an ideology."). The danger in this is the "implicit privileging of "masculine"
identified values - for example, freedom over love and the desire for intimacy - and a
masculine concept of the self." Id. at 132.
129. See Heesacker, supra note 9, at 483, n.17 (explaining stereotypes).
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family and law, in church and state to prevent women from enjoying
full personhood.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS NoRms
A. Historical Background
In the wake of World War II, internationalism was dramatically
transformed. After the Nazi war atrocities, human beings who up un-
til then had merely been objects of international law were recognized
as subjects of international law. 130 The human rights regime that
emerged from this tragedy is a rich and complex one. Significantly, in
reaching beyond the state and looking at individuals and their rights,
regardless of where they might be located, human rights law rede-
fined the concept of sovereignty. Formerly, sovereignty constituted an
omnipotent power of the state to do as it wished vis-A-vis its subjects
everywhere, and with respect to everyone within its territorial borders.
Today, human rights norms form a break in the wall of states' sover-
eign power. The idea of personhood, unbounded by territorial lines
or citizenship ties, originated as a reaction against sovereign abuse of
unfettered power.
The recent Pinochet case, like its Nuremberg precedent, con-
firms the human rights based notion of personhood: human beings,
their bodily integrity and their dignity, are supra sovereign and de-
serve universal protection. Human rights law protects the personhood
of Pinochet's Chilean (and other) victims against torture by him or
his regime even if the torture occurred in Chile while he was the head
of state. 131 How a state treats persons within its borders is no longer a
purely local, domestic, internal matter; it is an international concern.
Notwithstanding these broad protections, the human rights
model ought not be romanticized. The thriving international system
reflects the contradictions of liberalism's roots in the late eighteenth
century's political and social uprisings. These sought to identify im-
permissible governmental intrusions into individual rights,132 but
ironically coexisted with the institution of slavery - an institution that
included enslavement of both sexes - and with women's status as
mere chattel.
Moreover, the crafting of the human rights framework was consti-
tuted by the voices and positions of a few powerful states claiming to
130. The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals were created to address human rights
atrocities committed during the war, and to punish violators. The Nuremberg court
pointed out that "[clrimes against international law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the
provisions of international law be enforced." The Nuremberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110
(1946); see also Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Indi-
viduals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1982); see generally Louis B. SOHN,
CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 898-967 (1956).
131. Regina v. Bartle, 2 W.L.R. 827 (1999).
132. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
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speak for all states in promulgating universal, and universally binding,
norms. The construct, thus, reflects the deficiencies of liberal think-
ing and its origins with respect to sex, race, class, and community hier-
archy. Consequently, "the language used to enact, enforce, describe
or analyze [human rights] is not transparent, innocent, ahistorical or
simply instrumental." 13 3 There are Western assumptions, evaluations,
and even institutional divisions operating within human rights
norms.1 34 In addition, beyond being plagued by contradictions that
result from its ideological origins,135 the human rights system is
fraught with stresses that emerge from the diversity of the cultures,
languages, and religions around the world.
These realities suggest the need to develop, expand, and trans-
form the human rights model into a more inclusive one if it is to be of
utility to feminists. A critical revision of the internationalism legacy,
however, can influence in a positive way the rethinking, reconstruct-
ing, and reconstituting of normative standards to attain the goal of
full personhood for women. Human rights principles clearly set out
rich rights and entitlements of persons qua human beings. The system
includes express protections for both individuals and groups, recog-
nizing that personhood - human flourishing - requires thriving both
as an individual and as a member of larger communities. 13 6
B. Human Rights: Equality as a Universally Accepted Principle
Human rights norms further a humanitarian conception of per-
sonhood that transcend the limitations of current equality doctrine
and theory. The human rights framework is of great utility in a femi-
nist liberation project because it helps move the discourse beyond a
comparativistic sameness or difference approach to embrace nones-
sentialism. It goes beyond the narrow parameters of a legal equality
paradigm rooted in sameness, and moves the discourse towards a full
personhood perspective.
Thus, the formal human rights documents provide the founda-
tion for the full personhood model. The Universal Declaration incor-
porates civil and political rights as well as social, economic, and
cultural rights. 137 These entitlements have been reiterated in trea-
133. ROBERT J.C. YOUNG, COLONIAL DESIRE: HYBRIDITY IN THEORY, CULTURE AND
RACE 163 (1995).
134. Id. at 165.
135. Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol & Sharon Rush, Culture, Nationhood, and the
Human Rights Ideal, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 233 (2000).
136. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., Supp. No. 127, arts. X & Y, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal
Declaration]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 9, 1966, arts.
2 (protecting individuals) & 27 (protecting groups), S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976; ratified by the United States June 8,
1992) [hereinafter ICCPR].
137. Universal Declaration, supra note 136.
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ties 138 as well as in numerous conference documents. 139 Specifically,
human rights norms embrace the condition of human beings as free
and equal in dignity and rights; they confirm that freedoms are to be
enjoyed without discrimination on the bases of race, color, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth, or other status. 140 Life, liberty, and security of the per-
son are assured,"4 as are freedom of thought, conscience, and relig-
ion and freedom of opinion and expression."42 Moreover, the human
needs for rest and leisure,"43 the right to work,"44 health care, 145 ade-
quate standard of living including food and shelter,"46 and social se-
curity14 7, are expressly recognized, much as they were in Franklin D.
Roosevelt's Four Freedoms Speech. 148 Finally, human rights norms
also acknowledge the human need for community and express the
right to participate freely in cultural life."49 This translates to an em-
brace of sameness, difference, and nonessentialism.
In the human rights model, the plethora of articulated rights of
persons are inalienable, indivisible, and interdependent. 150 As such,
the human rights idea starkly contrasts with the United States' domes-
tic atomistic approach to the evaluation of equality; rather, it is con-
cerned with whether someone is attaining dignity, integrity, and full
138. ICCPR, supra note 136; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter Economic Covenant]; Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980)
[hereinafter CEDAW]; International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. TRrTv Doc. No. 95-2, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter CERD].
139. 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONG. 157/23 [hereinafter Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action]; Report of the World Summit for Social Development, Princi-
ples and Goals, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.166/9 (1995) [hereinafter World Summit]; Beij-
ing Declaration and Platform for Action, United Nations Fourth World Conference
on Women, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995) [hereinafter Beijing Declaration].
140. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 136; .ICCPR, supra note 136; Eco-
nomic Covenant, supra note 138.
141. Universal Declaration, supra note 136; ICCPR, supra note 136.
142. Universal Declaration, supra note 136; ICCPR, supra note 136.
143. Economic Covenant, supra note 138, at art. 7(d).
144. Id. at art. 6, para. 1.
145. Id. at art. 12.
146. Id. at art. 11, para. 1.
147. Id. at art. 9.
148. Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol, Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens: Emer-
gence, Evolution, Revolution, in WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 3, 27
(Kelly D. Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 1999).
149. ICCPR, supra note 136.
150. See Rhonda Copelon, The Indivisible Framework of International Human Rights:
Bringing It Home, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 37, at 216; Herndndez-Truyol,
supra note 148.
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citizenship. 51 In this regard, the human rights system's broad protec-
tions, such as color, national origin, social origin, property, birth, lan-
guage, 15 2 culture, 153 and family life, 154 go far beyond the local
protections available in the United States.
It is noteworthy that the formal notion of sex equality as a core
international tenet dates only to 1945 when the U.N. Charter stated its
intention to "reaffirm... the equal rights of men and women."'1 55 The
U.N. Charter further stated that one of its purposes was to achieve
international cooperation "in promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinc-
tion as to ... sex. .... ,,156 Following the U.N. Charter's lead, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,157 the ICCPR,15 8 and the
Economic Covenant1 59 all expressly have protected equality based on
"sex." These documents provide that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the
rights and freedoms.., without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status."6 °
Moreover, the thematic and regional human rights instruments
that have expanded and strengthened the human rights regime also
expressly provide for sex/gender equality. For instance, the three re-
gional instruments aimed at the protection of human rights (the Eu-
151. See Berta Hern~indez-Truyol, Breaking Cycles of Inequality: Critical Theory,
Human Rights, and the Family in/justice, in CRuTicA RACE THEORY (Valdes, Culp, Harris
eds., forthcoming 2002).
152. Universal Declaration, supra note 136; ICCPR, supra note 136; Economic
Covenant, supra note 138; CERD, supra note 138; CEDAW, supra note 138.
153. ICCPR, supra note 136.
154. Universal Declaration, supra note 136; ICCPR, supra note 136.
155. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
156. Id. at art. 1, para. 3.
157. Universal Declaration, supra note 136.
158. ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 2, para. 1.
159, Economic Covenant, supra note 138, at art. 2, para. 2.
160. Universal Declaration, supra note 136, at art. 2 (emphasis added). Similarly,
the ICCPR provides that.
[e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to en-
sure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other status.
ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added). In addition, in Article 26,
the ICCPR provides that, with the respect to the nondiscrimination provisions, "the
law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as ... sex ..." Id. at art. 26
(emphasis added). Finally, the Economic Covenant also provides for non-discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex. Economic Covenant supra note 138, at art. 2, para. 2. In
addition, the Economic Covenant provides that parties will "ensure the equal right of
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights" that are
articulated in that treaty. Id. at art. 3.
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ropean Convention, 16' the American Convention, 162 and the Banjul
Charter 163) all explicitly incorporate the right to sex equality, as do
other international human rights instruments. Significantly, the
"[e]qual enjoyment of human rights by women and men is a univer-
sally accepted principle."'164 The international community has recog-
nized the multidimensional nature of this principle to include:
* Equal access to basic social services, including education and
health;
" Equal opportunities for participation in political and economic
decision-making;
• Equal reward for equal work;
" Equal protection under the law;
" Elimination of discrimination by gender and violence against wo-
men; and
* Equal rights of citizens in all areas of life, both public - such as
the workplace - and private - such as the home.
165
To be sure, these aspirations and pronouncements have not uni-
formly translated to structural changes from human rights' liberal ori-
gins. For example, "the European Convention [on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms] embodies the classical liberal position of
the individual and there is an assumption that human rights discourse
is gender-neutral" 66 - a position that operates to isolate women in
anything but a gender-neutral way. Although "Article 5 of Protocol
No. 7 of the European Convention extends to spouses equal rights
and responsibilities in their relations with their children and in regard
to marriage, its dissolution and property,"'167 the European Conven-
tion has been criticized for its "role of non-interference rather than a
positive guarantee by the State to promote equality. Article 14 [of the
European Convention] does nothing to empower women and may
even filter out women's experiences of subordination. '168
Some changes, however, are beginning to emerge. In contrast to
the United States' and the European approaches, the Canadian gov-
ernment has embraced a positive guarantee of gender equality.169
161. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 (amended by Protocols 3, 5, 8,
and 11) [hereinafter European Convention].
162. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 1, 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970) [hereinafter American Convention].
163. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, effective Oct. 4, 1996, OAU
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, art. 2 [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
164. UNHDR 1995, supra note 31, at 1.
165. Id. It should be noted that the "equal pay for equal work" concept is
grounded on a sameness model that provides women should receive equal remunera-
tion when they perform the same work as men.
166. Palmer, supra note 113, at 225.
167. Id. at 233.
168. Id. at 235.
169. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt.I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 15; see also Palmer, supra note 113, at 235 (citing Andrews v. Law Society of
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Moreover, the human rights rules afford an impressive array of
rights (beyond those listed above) which include protection of rights
to privacy, health, equality, and nondiscrimination. Various rights per-
tinent and central to the protection of women's full personhood con-
tained in the various instruments are the rights to education; religion;
travel; family life; decision-making regarding the number of children
and their spacing; information; life, liberty, and security of the person;
integrity of the person; freedom from torture; freedom from slavery;
political participation; free assembly and association; work; enjoyment
of the benefits of scientific progress; development; environment;
peace; democracy; self-determination; and solidarity.1 70
C. Persistent Gendered Inequality
Notwithstanding the international community's recognition of
women's subordinate location and the need to better it, gendered ine-
quality is a persistent reality. In reviewing the conditions of women's
lives worldwide, two distressing facts surface. First, the rules have
been, at best, inadequate to effect women's equality. This is due, at
least in part, to the male nature of the domestic and international
legal systems. 171 For example, the public/private dichotomy in inter-
national law, as in the domestic sphere,
neglects the socioeconomic structures in which women's subordina-
tion occurs. It is primarily women who take care of children and
assume responsibility for domestic duties and that inevitably affects
their economic, social and political status. The emphasis placed on
the protection of individuals in the public sphere sidesteps the fact
that many women spend all, or at least part, of their lives within the
non-political private sphere, the realm of the family and domestic
life. Traditionally, this area of private life is considered inappropri-
ate for human rights and civil liberties protection.
... As the private sphere and the family play a central role in main-
taining sexual inequality, any system of human rights must avoid
conferring legitimacy on the right of men to freedom at the ex-
British Columbia, [1989] S.C.R. 143, and R v. Morgentaer, [1988] S.C.R. 30) ("The Su-
preme Court of Canada has adopted a contextual approach to equality rights which
requires a court to examine the historical disadvantage of a group and consider sub-
stantial inequality. Through the adoption of this approach, women have a voice and
their stories can be presented to the court." (citation omitted)). Women's Legal Edu-
cation and Action Fund (LEAF) stated in response that "[w]omen must get their sto-
ries into court to develop a body of evidence about women's poverty, physical
vulnerability and social and legal inequality in order to force the courts to respond."
Id. (citation omitted).
170. See Hern~ndez-Truyol, supra note 97, at 624-28 (listing rights and sources
thereof).
171. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 54, at 4041.
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pense of the oppression of women in the forgotten domestic
sphere.' 7 2
Second, locally and globally women simply do not enjoy the uni-
versal human rights to which they are legally entitled. This is as true in
the West as it is in the East, and in the North as in the South. 173 The
condition of women, as evidenced by the tragedies in Bosnia,174 Ha-
iti, 175 and Rwanda, 176 where women have been pillaged and raped as
instruments or prizes of war,177 and Afghanistan, where women have
172. Palmer, supra note 113, at 233 (citing Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of
the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 285 (S. Benn &
C. Gaus eds., 1983)).
173. See generally The World's Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, U.N. Doc. ST/
ESA/Stat/Ser.K/16 (2000) (noting that there is a persistent gender gap in education;
that women's lives are formed by reproductive capacity and choices; that women re-
main underrepresented in international and local governance, remaining a minus-
cule number of public representatives; that women's form of work is unpaid,
underpaid, and unrecognized; and that women continue to be victims of physical and
sexual abuse and violence which is underreported, a reality exacerbated in the refu-
gee population, a group of which women and girls comprise 50%). See also UNHDR
1995, supra note 31, at 2.
174. See Letter from the International Women's Human Rights Law Clinic
(IWHRLC) at City University of New York School of Law to the Secretary-General,
Organization of American States, The Member States and the General Assembly 1
(June 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter IWHRLC Letter] ("On March 23, the
UN/OAS Observer Mission reported.., that 12 women and girls had been raped in
Port-au-Prince and concluded that it appeared that rape was being used as an instru-
ment of terror against the female population of Haiti who were suspected or desig-
nated as opponents of the illegal regime."). The 1WHRLC demanded effective
investigation, publicization and prosecution of crimes. Id. at 2. See also Karen Knop,
Re/Statements: Feminism and State Sovereignty, in 3 INTERNATIONAL LAw, TRANSNATIONAL
LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 293, 294 n.4 (1993) (citing Donna E. Arzt, Genoci-
dal Rape in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia and the Role of International Law
(1993) (unpublished manuscript)); Rhonda Copelon, Gendered War Crimes: Reconceptu-
alizing Rape in Time of War, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMI-
NIST PERSPECTIVES 197 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995) [hereinafter
WOMEN'S RIGHTS] (commenting on mass rape of women in former Yugoslavia); Jas-
mine Kuzmanovic, Legacies of Invisibility: Past Silence, Present Violence Against Women in
the Former Yugoslavia, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra, at 57 (for accounts of rape in Bosnia).
175. See IWHRLC Letter, supra note 174.
176. See DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1994, 206 (1995) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 1994] (noting rapes on massive scale
by combatant forces).
177. See Copelon, supra note 174, at 204 (discussing rape of women as "booty" of
war). Rape was not treated as a crime for which the Japanese Commander would be
separately charged at the Judgment of the Military Tribunal in Tokyo. Id. at 197.
There existed the systematic rapes in both World Wars, including the "rape of Ger-
man women by the conquering Russian army and the enslavement on the battlefields
of 200,000-400,000 'comfort women' by the Japanese army." Id. at 197. See Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 139, at 204, which coincided with
the revelation of the mass rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including a general condem-
nation of gender violence as well as making specific mention of "'systemic rape, sex-
ual slavery and forced pregnancy' in armed conflict." Copelon, supra note 174, at 198
(citing Report of the Drafting Committee, Addendum, Final Outcome of the World
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been erased from public life, illustrates that women are a long way
from being full citizens who are universally respected or heard, let
alone safe.
Significantly, this is not a woman's reality solely in times of war.
One need not travel to Bosnia or Rwanda or even contemplate a state
of war to observe evidence of women's inequality. One need only
look at the realities of everyday life. The United Nations, with its own
ranks plagued by inequality, confirms the persistent and prevailing
gender disparities in its description of women as the "world's largest
excluded group."178 The United Nations' 1993 Human Development
Report labeled women as a "non-participating majority" because, de-
spite the fact that women constitute a majority of the world's popula-
tion, they "receive only a small share of developmental
opportunities." 179 This sad truth of women's subordinate status is
borne out regardless of which statistics are considered: employment,
economics, personal autonomy, education, political participation,
health, or personal security (i.e., freedom from violence) 180 - all mat-
Conference on Human Rights, June 24, 1993, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/PC/Add. 1);
see also Peters & Wolper, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 174, at 1 (noting that rape by
soldiers is among gendered crimes suffered by women).
The rape of women in war is not limited to global wars. For example, as part of
an investigatory mission in Peru, members of Amnesty International questioned a mil-
itary commander whether his soldiers ever raped women: "'Yes, of course.' That was
followed up with the statement that when you have men who are headquartered away
from their homes for a long time . . . they need to have their needs met somehow.
There was not even the sense that this person should take care and deny (this). When
they raised the question of torture, of course that was denied. But there wasn't even
the sense that [rape] was something that should be looked at askance." Elisabeth
Friedman, Women's Human Rights: The Emergence of a Movement, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
supra note 174, at 18, 26 (citation omitted); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163,
1993 WL 385757 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Doe v. Karadzic, 866 F. Supp. 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
178. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOP-
MENT REPORT 1993, 25 (1993) [hereinafter UNHDR 1993].
179. Id.; see also Berta E. Herndndez-Truyol, Out in Left Field: Cuba's Post-Cold War
Strikeout, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 15, 30 (1994) (outlining different results in Cuba
than those reported in UNHDR 1993, supra note 178); Siobhan Dowd, Women and the
Word: The Silencing of the Feminine, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 174, at 317 (describ-
ing how women's illiteracy silences their voices).
180. See UNHDR 1993, supra note 178, at 25 (highlighting routine exclusion of
women from "educational [opportunities] or from better jobs, from political systems
or from adequate health care"); UNITED NATIONS HuMAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
HuMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1994, 96 (1994) [hereinafter UNHDR 1994] (conced-
ing that "men generally fare better than women on almost every socio-economic indi-
cator"); see also UNHDR 1993, supra note 178, at 29 (expressing the existence of a
"widespread pattern of inequality between men and women . . . in their access to
education, health and nutrition, and even more in their participation in the eco-
nomic and political spheres"); Herudndez-Truyol, supra note 179, at 30-31 (detailing
analogous situation women confront in Cuba notwithstanding paper commitments to
equality). Moreover, Charlotte Bunch has observed that:
The importance of control over women can be seen in the intensity of resis-
tance to laws and social changes that put control of women's bodies in wo-
men's hands: reproductive rights; freedom of sexuality whether,
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ters that are critical to women's enjoyment of their international
rights and freedoms. Notwithstanding the existing "paper rights," the
universal fact is that women, simply because of their sex, are routinely
subjected to torture, starvation, terrorism, humiliation, mutilation,
rape, close and multiple births and other preventable maternity-re-
lated health risks, economic duress, and sexual exploitation.181
Recurrently, numerous practices are inflicted on women simply
because of their sex and are justified or explained by culture and tra-
dition: genital mutilation; female infanticide; bride burning; foot-
binding; slavery; veiling; wife-beating; honor-killing; forced preg-
nancy; forced abortion; and multiple, early, and closely spaced child-
bearing and birthing, to name but a few.182 It is inconceivable that
these practices, which some accept without protest because they are
based on sex, would be justified if they were instead predicated upon
another protected classification such as race (although until recently,
culture and tradition were used to justify racial discrimination, includ-
ing apartheid and slavery).' 8 3 Yet not all of these practices, individu-
ally and collectively, interfere with women's general well-being and
perpetuate women's second-class status and condition.
In fact, the United States Department of State (another male-
dominated institution) recognizes "the problem of rampant discrimi-
nation against women" 18 4 and the resulting myriad human rights vio-
lations women suffer simply because of their sex.' 8 5 Women
heterosexual or lesbian; laws that criminalize rape in marriage and so on.
Abusing women physically maintains this territorial domination and is some-
times accompanied by other forms of human rights abuse such as slavery
[forced prostitution], sexual terrorism [rape], or imprisonment [confine-
ment to the home].
Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a Feminist Perspective, in WOMEN'S
RIGHTS, supra note 174, at 11, 15.
181. Hernindez-Truyol, supra note 97, at 634-35.
182. Id. at 634-37.
183. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism and the Jurisprudence
of Transformation: Forward, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1995) (noting system of apartheid
was based on race). Interestingly, the United States once utilized a similar cultural
justification to sanction the institution and maintenance of slavery. See Gwendolyn
Mikell, African Structural Adjustment: Women and Legal Changes, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 7
(1995).
184. See DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1993, xvi (1994) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 1993].
185. Basically, the Department of State agrees with and confirms the United Na-
tion's evaluation concerning the status of women worldwide. The State Department
reports that there exists
the problem of rampant discrimination against women. Physical abuse is the
most obvious example. In many African countries, the practice of female
genital mutilation continued. In Pakistan, many women in police custody
are subjected to sexual or physical violence. On several continents, women
and girls are sold into prostitution. In many Gulf countries, domestic ser-
vants from Southeast Asia are forced to work excessively long hours and are
sometimes physically and sexually abused. In Bangladesh and India, dowry
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worldwide are rendered invisible and silenced by being killed,186 phys-
ically abused into submission, 187 and even starved. 188
In sum, women's rights and freedoms are imperiled by the sys-
tematic denial of their political, 18 9 economic, 190 social, 19 1 civil, 192 and
deaths continue. Marital rape in many countries is not recognized as a
crime, and women raped or beaten at home often have no recourse. That
female life is not valued as much as male life is apparent in countries such as
China where it is reported that more female fetuses than male are aborted.
Id. at xvi; see also Rebecca J. Cook, State Responsibility for Violations of Women's Human
Rights, 7 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 125, 129 n.19 (1994) (citing Andrew Byrnes, Women,
Feminism and International Human Rights Law - Methodological Myopia, Fundamental
Flaws or Meaningful Marginalization, 12 AusTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 205, 214 (1992)).
186. For example, the Shining Path insurgency in Peru "often murdered [wo-
men], either to punish, intimidate, or coerce particular female victims or as part of
their efforts to achieve broader political ends." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD RE-
PORT 1994 (1993), at 359. The greater value placed on males is sometimes evidenced
before birth. In some countries, pre-natal testing is used to ascertain the sex of the
fetus which may then be aborted if it proves to be female. UNHDR 1995, supra note
31, at 7. Such sex-based feticide is arguably a violation of human rights. See, e.g., The
1994 International Conference on Population and Development, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 171/3 (1994), at 4.23 [hereinafter ICPD] ("Governments are urged to take
the necessary measures to prevent infanticide, prenatal sex selection, trafficking in
girl children and use of girls in prostitution and pornography."). Similarly, the phe-
nomenon of "missing women" - a shortfall of the expected male to female ratio in
population - estimated at over 100 million women is attributed to the lack of value in
female life ranging from feticide to less adequate nutrition being provided to girls
than boys. UNHDR 1995, supra note 31, at 7, 35.
187. See UNHDR 1994, supra note 180, at 31 ("In no society are women secure or
treated equally to men .... And from childhood through adulthood, they are abused
because of their gender .... It was recently estimated that one-third of wives in devel-
oping countries are physically battered. One woman in 2,000 in the world is reported
to have been raped."); UNHDR 1995, supra note 31, at 7 (studies in various countries
show sexual abuse of females during childhood or adolescence; a million children in
Asia, mostly girls, are forced into prostitution; approximately 100 million girls experi-
ence female genital mutilation; high percentages of married women experience do-
mestic violence; high percentages of women are raped in their lifetimes; a high
percentage of women are murdered by present or former partners; marital violence is
a leading cause of female suicide).
188. See supra note 181; UNHDR 1995, supra note 31, at 35 ("[P]erception is
widespread that infant boys are fed more adequately than infant girls.... [And a]dult
women suffer more than men from malnutrition .... ).
189. The right to political participation is guaranteed by, inter alia, Universal
Declaration, supra note 136, at art. 21; ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 25; CEDAW,
supra note 138, at arts. 7-8; European Convention, supra note 161, at arts. 10-11; Amer-
ican Convention, supra note 162, at arts. 16, 23; Banjul Charter, supra note 163, at art.
13.
190. See, e.g., Economic Covenant, supra note 138. Specifically, art. 11 (2) (a)-(b)
requires equitable distribution of resources. Id. In addition, the CEDAW, supra note
138, at art. 13(b), seeks specifically to ensure equal access to economic resources to
women. The recently-concluded conference documents also focus on the need for
women's economic empowerment. See, e.g., ICPD, supra note 186, at princs. 3, 3.16
(right to development), 10, 4.2, 4.4, 4.12, 4.18, 4.29, 11.1, 11.16 (education), 3.18
(employment), 3.22, 4.1 (economic resources); World Summit, supra note 139, at
commitment 1, 15 (right to development), 5 (education), 3(c), 3(f), 5(j), 45, 51(d),
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other legal rights which purportedly ensure women's full participation
in the cultural and political life of the state. 193 In today's world, some
women are still silenced by exclusion from such basic activities as vot-
ing,' 94 traveling, 195 and testifying in court. 196 In addition, women are
shut out of economic discourse by being forbidden to inherit and own
property' 97 and being routinely denied access to education, 98 remu-
73(d), 82 (employment), 1, 2, 3, 6, 9, 26(e), 26 (g), 56(c) (economic resources).
Much of the discourse in Beijing surrounded women's much-needed access to eco-
nomic resources including the issue of women's non-remunerated employment. Beij-
ing Declaration, supra note 139, at 62, 158, 167, 209, 212 (access to resources), 60,
163, 180 (access to employment in terms of eliminating gender differences in salary
and available jobs); see also Nadia H. Youssef, Women's Access to Productive Resources: The
Need for Legal Instruments to Protect Women's Development Rights, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS,
supra note 174, at 279, 279-84 (noting that land reform laws and resettlement pro-
grams in particular discriminate against women who also experience discrimination
in access to livestock and credit). Youssef explained that:
Excluding women from the bases of rural productivity has been achieved by:
(1) denying women rights to land ownership; (2) stipulating 'exceptions' for
women in cases where full ownership of land is granted irrespective of sex;
and, most important, (3) 'masculinizing' the head of household concept on
the premise that all families contain an adult male economically responsible
for maintaining women and children.
Id. at 281.
191. See, e.g., Economic Covenant, supra note 138, passim; CEDAW, supra note
138, passim (economic, social and cultural rights of persons).
. 192. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 136, passim; CEDAW, supra note 138, passim (for
recognized civil rights of persons).
193. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 136; Economic Covenant, supra note 138;
CEDAW, supra note 138, passim.
194. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1993, supra note 184, at xvi, (noting that women
throughout world are denied the right to vote); id. at 1231 (Kuwaiti women are de-
nied the right to vote).
195. UNHDR 1995, supra note 31, at 43 ("In some Arab countries, a husband's
consent is necessary for a wife to obtain a passport, but not vice versa."). In Iran,
married women may not travel abroad without written permission from their hus-
bands or fathers. See id. ("Women cannot leave the country without their husband's
permission in Iran."); Akram Mirhosseini, After the Revolution: Violations of Women's
Human Rights in Iran, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 174, at 72. This is also the case in
Saudi Arabia, and in Nigeria, where a married woman cannot obtain a passport with-
out her husband's permission. See generally Marsha A. Freeman, The Human Rights of
Women in the Family: Issues and Recommendations for Implementation of the Women's Conven-
tion, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 174, at 149, 151.
196. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1993, supra note 184, at 1220-21 (under Shar'ia law in
Jordan, a woman's court testimony equals half that of a man).
197. Under Islamic inheritance laws in Kuwait, a Muslim woman may receive
only half of what male heirs receive, and "[u] nder customary law in Africa ... where
[there] is communal or clan [real] property, a woman has no right to exercise owner-
ship rights over it." Julie Mertus, State Discriminatory Family Law and Customary Abuses,
in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 174, at 135, 142. Also, in many countries law and/or
tradition dictates that the husband has exclusive control over marital property. Free-
man, supra note 195, at 151, 158-59. For example, "[m]arried women are under the
permanent guardianship of their husbands and have no right to manage property in
Botswana, Chile, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland." UNHDR 1995, supra note 31, at
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nerated employment,199 and health care.20 0 Some girls and women
have their nutritional needs and food denied because of their sex.
20 1
In a cruel twist, women are even denied custody of the children they
have borne, simply because of their sex.20 2 Thus, regardless of a uni-
versal sex-equality norm, women's reality is one of gross inequality.
198. Since the Islamic Revolution in Iran,
women have been excluded from 79 out of 157 courses of study in the uni-
versity: 55 courses out of 84 in technology and mathematics, 7 out of 40 in
natural sciences, and 17 out of the remaining 33. Only 50% of the women
who passed the entrance examination in medicine have been allowed to at-
tend. Women have been banned from all four fields of agriculture. In the
faculties of letters and humanities, only 10 of 35 courses are available to
women, and women are not allowed to study archaeology, the restoration of
historic monuments, handicrafts, graphics, visual communications or cine-
matography. They are banned from the central Art Institute. In industrial
design, there is the maximum quota of 20 percent women. In most fields,
women are denied scholarships and not allowed to leave Iran for postgradu-
ate study.
Mirhosseini, supra note 195, at 74. Significantly, "[a]mong the world's 900 million
illiterate people, women outnumber men two to one." UNHDR 1995, supra note 31,
at 34.
199. Moreover, Rebecca Cook has noted that:
[w] omen suffer additional discrimination, however, because roles identified
with female gender are not valued in social and economic terms. Those who
perform domestic and child care work in their own homes are frequently
regarded as "unemployed" and ineligible for non-monetary benefits related
to paid employment.... Service roles associated with females ... have al-
most invariably been low paid.
REBECCA J. COOK, WOMEN'S HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PROMOTION AND PRO-
TECTION OF WOMEN'S HEALTH THROUGH INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 6 (1994);
see also UNHDR 1995, supra note 31, at 43 ("Husbands can restrict a wife's employ-
ment outside the home in Bolivia, Guatemala and Syria.")
200. See Rebecca J. Cook, International Human Rights and Women's Reproductive
Health, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS, supra note 174, at 256 (noting historical lack of protection
of women's reproductive health rights); COOK, supra note 199; UNITED NATIONS, WO-
MEN: CHALLENGES TO THE YEAR 2000, 23 (1991) [hereinafter CHALLENGES] (women's
health needs "are almost everywhere inadequately addressed").
201. In Bangladesh, girls have a seventy percent higher mortality rate than boys.
Girls are more likely to receive less access to health care than boys in many countries,
and in the developing world girls are more than four times as likely as boys to be
malnourished. See CHALLENGES, supra note 200, at 23. A shocking example of discrimi-
natory health practices is revealed in a picture of a Pakistani woman holding her two
small twins. The boy, who was breast-fed, is plump and healthy-looking. The girl, who
was bottle-fed, is less than half her brother's size and obviously near death from
malnourishment. The woman's mother-in-law told her that she did not have enough
breast milk for both children, so only the boy was breast fed. The twin sister died the
day after the photo was taken. Id.; see also UNHDR 1995, supra note 31, at 35.
202. For example, Qatari women rarely obtain custody of children after a di-
vorce, and non-Muslim women never do. See COUNTRY REPORTS 1994, supra note 176,
at 1163. In Iran, women only obtain custody of children if both the father and grand-
father of the children are dead. See Mirhosseini, supra note 195, at 73; see also Mertus,
supra note 197, at 135, 141 (noting that under shar'ia, women lose custody of their
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D. Full Personhood
In looking at full personhood for women, I am on a quest for a
new civility in this global society - an environment which would har-
monize women's realities with their legal rights. Women's flourishing
requires humanity, dignity, and access to basic survival habiliments.
Personhood, thus, constitutes the proverbial bundle of sticks that be-
longs to persons because they are human beings. Personhood is both
individualistic and relational; it engages the reality that human thriv-
ing and dignity are indivisibly connected not only to individual fulfill-
ment, but also to membership and participation in our varied and
various communities. These communities include political communi-
ties as well as economic and social locations such as the family, relig-
ious affiliations, and place(s) of employment.
In order for women to attain full personhood, it is imperative to
eschew the notion that liberal individualistic visions are irreconcilable
with communitarian traditions. Rather, they must be embraced as in-
terdependent dimensions of human existence - coexisting, overlap-
ping modalities. Given the complexity of the elements necessary for
human flourishing, it is more useful and constructive to move away
from dichotomizing rights or paradigms and towards a complemen-
tary approach. In the context of feminism, we should not contem-
plate sameness or difference. Rather, especially in light of
Heesacker's and Gilligan's findings, we should embrace sameness and
difference in a nonessentialist manner.
As history has shown, a blueprint premised solely on one side of
the equation is structurally defective and is not useful over time or
across varied geographies. Human lives are constituted by interlock-
ing communities - ranging from the world, our countries, and our
local communities to our work, religion, family, nationality, language,
and ethnicity. The oppositional stance that views these complemen-
tary locations in juxtaposition to, rather than in tandem with, each
other ignores the reality and context within which people exist in
society.
Exploring the universality and relativism dyad by looking at the
culture of power and the power of culture also exposes the weakness
of dichotomization. 20 3 Indeed, the culture of power universally im-
poses the visions of a few on everyone all of the time. As the feminist
critiques of law discussed in Part II above show, this is not right.
Universality should not mean someone's culture is imposed on every-
one else; it should not mean that legal theories, structures, and sys-
tems are created only by men and only for men. To the contrary,
children when boys are seven (or reach puberty) and girls are nine (or of marriagea-
ble age)).
203. For a more detailed analysis of the universalism-relativism dyad, see Guyora
Binder, Cultural Relativism and Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 211, 211 (1999).
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universality should be a vehicle used for building consensus, plural-
ism, and democracy, not one deployed to effect gendered erasures
from law. Attaining full personhood requires that we be both liberals
and relationalists.
This human rights construct is useful for a feminist anti-subordi-
nation project. It is a promising starting point for designing a model
that will enable women's attainment of full personhood. The human
rights model seeks to enable women's full personhood in the home
and in the streets, in the family and in the workplace, at labor and at
play. Accordingly, the following section presents two models of inter-
national lawmaking: communications theory and legitimacy theory. I
then utilize the principles presented in those models to create the
foundation of a methodology that aims at creating an analytical frame-
work that will promote the goal of attaining women's full personhood.
IV. MAKING CHANGE: THE BASIC MODELS
In the previous section, this essay showed how use of the human
rights framework assists the feminist anti-subordination project by ex-
panding the foundation of what constitutes fundamental human
rights predicate to full personhood. Significantly, that foundation in-
cludes civil and political as well as social, economic, and cultural
rights. The construct views rights in these categories as inalienable,
indivisible, and interdependent. In this section, two models are used
as the foundation of a methodology for feminist inquiry that will pro-
mote the realization of full personhood for women.
The two models that this work utilizes were developed in recogni-
tion that theory concerning the formation of international law is inad-
equate to analyze modern concerns and the proper location of such
concerns is in the spectrum of international law. One model, the
"communications theory," also known as the New Haven School, es-
pouses a policy orientation in law-making. The other, Professor
Thomas Franck's legitimacy theory, scrutinizes the elements that
render norms legitimate and thus result in norm compliance.
The proposed use of the models to further a feminist project
both expands and transcends the models' original focus on law-mak-
ing. I apply these models to develop a methodology that is appropri-
ate to any interrogation ofjustice - be it law or other norm formation,
its interpretation, or its enforcement. The methodology contextual-
izes problems to reveal internal or structural biases, unearths inconsis-
tencies in theory and practice, and serves to unveil the schisms
between the myth of equality and the reality of inequality in women's
lives.
A. Communications Theory
The New Haven School takes a "policy oriented" approach to law.
It recognizes that international law - as is the case for any legal disci-
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pline - is not, and cannot be, a static process. Rather, it "is a continu-
ing process through which the common interest of the members of
the world community are clarified and secured.... The ultimate goal
[of the process is] the establishment of a world community of human
dignity. '20 4 The establishment of such a global community necessi-
tates the attainment of full personhood for women.
The crafters, led by Myres McDougal and Harold Laswell, de-
signed this policy perspective when they recognized the weaknesses of
rule orientation, including the problematics of viewing norms as inde-
pendent of society.20 5 Communication theorists articulated six flaws
inherent in the realists' rule orientation:
" It is mired in the limitations of positivism; whereas, the heart of
jurisprudence is to engage decision-makers, to elucidate their
goals, and to contextualize the problems.20 6
" It rendered invisible, if not irrelevant, the various processes and
stages of legal application and focused only on the rule and the
court.
2 0 7
" Focusing on "rules," it failed to relate them to the social and polit-
ical values that provided context for the rules. 20 8
" It failed to consider power in the equation of decision making - a
critically important and sometimes outcome determinative
element. 20 9
* It failed to comprehend that the legal "institutions and struc-
tures" are fluid and ever-changing - they are "the products of an
ongoing constitutive process." 2 10
" Finally, it focused exclusively on the local, thereby ignoring the
impact of the global in the local and the local in the global.2 11
In response to these shortcomings of realism, the New Haven
School adopted a policy-oriented approach to "provide a constructive
204. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTVE 4 (1989).
205. Id. at 14-15.
[This] policy oriented approach identifies international law as an ongoing
process of authoritative decision in which many decision makers continually
formulate and reformulate policy.... It projects and relates international
law to the living context of the contemporary world rather than to the inner
or unreal world of autonomous rules and logical exercises.... In sum, this
policy oriented approach is contextual, problem-solving, and multimethod
in nature.
Id.
206. See W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 108
YALE L.J. 935, 936 (1999); CHEN, supra note 204.
207. Reisman, supra note 206, at 936; CHEN, supra note 204, at 11.
208. Reisman, supra note 206, at 936; CHEN, supra note 204, at 11.
209. Reisman, supra note 206, at 936.
210. Id. at 937.
211. Id. at 937; on the local and global interaction, see Boaventura de Sousa
Santos, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Human Rights, in MORAL IMPERIALIsM: A
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY (Berta E. Hern~indez-Truyol ed., forthcoming 2002).
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jurisprudence of problem solving."2 12 As a contemporary New Haven
theorist puts it, "The Copernican Revolution in McDougal's jurispru-
dence was in unseating rules as the mechanism of decision and install-
ing the human being - all human beings, to varying degrees - as
deciders.... McDougal committed himself to developing a theory
about law that could establish and sustain a free society. ... 213
Significantly, the weaknesses of deeming norms in a vacuum as
independent of society are also plainly revealed in the various feminist
critiques of law. Thus, it is not surprising that the various feminist criti-
ques of the male-orientation in law parallel the six-point New Haven
critique of the rule orientation of positivism. First, the liberal individ-
ualistic and atomistic conceptualization of law, specifically equality
norms, failed to provide context for the different gendered social real-
ities. Second, it rendered women invisible and effected their erasure
from legal structures. Third, it failed to relate norms to the human
interactions that provide the context for the norms. Fourth, it failed
to consider power in the equation of decision-making. Fifth, it failed
to recognize the structural gendered biases in legal institutions and
structures. Lastly, it focused solely on the individual ignoring the real-
ity of the impact of social institutions - family, school, church, work -
on the individual and the individual's existence in constant relation to
these institutions.
Moreover, the communication theoretical framework, particu-
larly its acknowledgment of the importance and significance of con-
text and the centering of the human subject in law, is a useful tool for
a feminist project which has suffered from a simplistic approach to the
complex problem of equality. A discursive approach - a communica-
tions process - facilitates not only the unearthing and debunking of
the male perspective inherent in legal norms, structures, and institu-
tions that has stalled women's gains but also the inclusion of women's
voices in a reconstruction phase. Such an approach recognizes that
decision making involves consideration of more than "black letter"
law, it also includes consideration - and likely reconsideration - of the
policies and purposes behind the laws.
Indeed, Harold Laswell, one of the original proponents of the
communications theory, recognized the inability of law alone to have
an effect on human behavior. 214 Thus, he grounded the policy ap-
proach, which he deemed to be a functional approach 215 to lawmak-
212. CHEN, supra note 204, at 14.
213. Reisman, supra note 206, at 937.
214. W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communica-
tion, Luncheon Address (Apr. 24, 1981), in 75 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 101, 105
(1981).
215. Id. at 107.
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ing, in a process of communication. 2 16 To facilitate the necessary
communications, a series of questions was crafted to guide analysis. 217
Moreover, communications theorists acknowledged the impor-
tance of perspective, recognizing the subjectivity inherent in any one
person's analysis:
The function of the responsible jurist, advisor or decisionmaker,
who is a part of that process, is to develop an appropriate observa-
tional standpoint, clarify community goals, identify and then per-
form the intellectual tasks that will enable him or her to assist those
who seek legal or policy advice in clarifying goals, and in imple-
menting them in ways compatible with the common interests of the
most inclusive community.2 18
To make a decision, alternatives must be considered; various and
varied sets of values must be investigated, taken into account, and
weighed. This is precisely what feminists have been asking of law: the
rejection of the destructive in/justice paradox. We would strongly
agree with the New Haven School observation that "[d]ivorced from
policy and context, rules are skeletons without body and soul."2 1 9
Beyond "the normative ambiguity involved in rules, rules are
commonly phrased in general and abstract ways. . . . [Thus r] igid
rules cannot be relied on automatically to resolve a controversy with-
out consideration of context and function."2 20 Again, these pro-
nouncements are fully compatible with the feminist critique of the
maleness of law that perpetuates the status quo under the guise of
neutrality.
New Haven theorists also rejected the necessity or advisability of a
precedent-bound system of analysis that imbues rule orientation be-
cause it hinders creativity in searching for solutions to new and com-
plex problems. 22' For example, policy orientation also requires that
articulation of public order objectives be clear and specific.22 2 It rec-
ognizes that considerations will vary
from context to context. In groups in which there is a high sense of
collective purpose, and common interests have been internalized in
the personalities of politically relevant members, authority signals
alone may be sufficient to create prescriptive expectations. In ag-
gregates in which inclusive identifications and perceptions of com-
216. Id. at 105.
217. Id. at 105 (articulating the questions of "Who? Says What? In Which chan-
nel? To Whom? With What Effect?").
218. Myres S. McDougal, Preface to HAROLD D. LASWELL & MYRES S. McDOUGAL,
JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAw, SCIENCE, AND POLICY at v (student
ed., 1997).
219. CHEN, supra note 204, at 12.
220. Id. at 13.
221. Id. at 13 (noting that "inherent in ... preoccupation with past decisions is
the assumption, conscious or unconscious, that what has been done in the past will,
and should be, repeated in the future").
222. Id. at 15, 19-20.
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mon interest are low or merely rhetorical, the communication of
control intention may be most important.2 23
The discursive approach to norms' considerations, the recogni-
tion of complexity in society, and the goal of a free society are useful
tools for a feminist liberation project. Indeed, the lack of creativity
the communications model has identified in the stare decisis ap-
proach is part and parcel of what has stunted law's development in a
feminist model.
These basic premises assist the feminist project of placing women
at the center, rather than in the shadows, of the law. Concepts cen-
tered on the notion of communications and context, as well as on the
centrality of humanness in norms, will well serve women whose diverse
interests and locations have not been uniformly advanced by any one
of the feminist theories or by international rules mandating gender
equality. Feminist inquiry requires a holistic (contextual) analytical
framework. As Becker acknowledges, "part of the problem is the fail-
ure of feminists, particularly feminists working for legal change, to
look at the big picture .... ,224 A contextual analysis presents a struc-
turally deficient space for the attainment of full personhood by
women.
B. Legitimacy Theory
The second theoretical model that this work uses to propose a
methodology that will promote women's full personhood is Professor
Thomas Franck's legitimacy theory. This theory was developed in the
context of rule legitimacy in the community of states. It is the analyti-
cal structure that Franck crafted to analyze why, in a community in
which there is no coercive power because every actor is a sovereign,
states nevertheless obey laws. The thesis was that "in a community
organized around rules, compliance is secured - to whatever degree it
is - at least in part by [the] perception of a rule as legitimate by those
to whom it is addressed. '22 5 The idea of
[l]egitimacy is used... to mean that quality of a rule which derives
from a perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that
it has come into being in accordance with right process. Right pro-
cess includes the notion of valid sources but also encompasses liter-
ary, socio-anthropological and philosophical insights. 2 2 6
Thus, this too is an approach that makes context relevant.
Franck identifies four elements as "indicators of rule legitimacy in
the community of states[:] . . . determinacy, symbolic validation, co-
223. Reisman, supra note 214, at 112.
224. Becker, supra note 66.
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herence and adherence (to a normative hierarchy). "227 He found that
when "rules exhibit these properties, they appear to exert a strong
pull on states to comply with their commands." 228 As will be shown
below, these factors assist in unearthing the reasons for the failure of
equality norms to end women's subordination. Differently stated, and
bringing Laswell's observations to bear, legitimacy theory provides a
perspective - a lens through which to analyze women's conditions -
and serves to confirm and transform the law's inability to change cul-
turally entrenched and reinforced behavior about women's subordi-
nated social position. 229
Legitimacy theory's four elements assist in my undertaking to de-
velop a methodology to identify, expose, and eradicate the locations
at which the law and legal system operate to perpetuate and entrench
women's disadvantaged, unequal status - in the civil, political, social,
economic, and cultural realms. I deploy the idea of legitimacy to eval-
uate whether rules, in particular equality norms, can be legitimate as
articulated or as applied if they have sorely and severely failed to
achieve the anticipated outcome of equality for women. As I structure
it, the utility of the legitimacy theory in the women's context is the
identification of the failures of long-standing rules, norms, and
processes to enable women's full citizenship and personhood when
the articulated purpose - legally mandated - of those rules, norms,
and processes is to achieve women's equality. That is, I go to the real-
ity of women's lives and move backwards through the legal maze to
ascertain the location of failure, and hence the illegitimacy, of the
norm. I will illustrate this by going through each of the identified
elements requisite to legitimacy and analyzing the equality notions we
have today.
1. Determinacy
Textual determinacy, "the ability of [a] text to convey a clear mes-
sage, to appear transparent in the sense that one can see through the
language to the meaning,"230 is "the most self-evident of all character-
istics making for legitimacy . -"231 " [D] eterminacy is the linguistic or
literary-structural component of' legitimacy. 23 2 While indeterminacy
may allow for flexibility, it has costs because "[i] ndeterminate norma-
tive standards not only make it harder to know what conformity is
expected, but also make it easier to justify noncompliance. '" 23 3 Franck,
quoting Wittgenstein, notes that while
227. Id. at 712.
228. Id.
229. Reisman, supra note 206.
230. Franck, supra note 225, at 713.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 725.
233. Id. at 714.
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no 'course of action could be determined by a rule because every
course of action can be made out to accord with the rule' some
rules are less malleable, less open to manipulation.... To be legiti-
mate, a rule must communicate what conduct is permitted and what
conduct is out of bounds.2 3 4
Franck's study concludes that "[a] high degree of textual deter-
minacy goes together with a high degree of rule-conforming state be-
havior. '23 5 However, he cautions that "'clarity' is far from identical
with simplicity." 23 6 A rule that is simple will nonetheless not satisfy the
legitimacy standard if "it does not send a clear message as to its mean-
ing in such a way as to promote compliance. '23 7 The balance between
"simplicity of text [which] is an invitation to reductio ad absurdum,
which undermines the determinacy of a rule, and . . . complexity
[which] imposes an elasticity that deprives it of determinate meaning"
is attained by "attention to detail and, in particular, to content. '238
Thus, a simple rule will have a high degree of determinacy if it guides
behavior that is properly judged in an either/or context.239
However, when the judgment requires a decision between more
than two options, that is, when the question constitutes a complex
problematic as is the case of women in local and global societies, sim-
ple rules fail to satisfy the textual legitimacy standard. On the other
hand,
[a] rule finely calibrated to reflect complex considerations, embody-
ing a textured system of regulatory and exculpatory principles, may
suffer legitimacy costs because it invites disputes as to its applicabil-
ity in any particular case. These costs however, can be reduced by
introducing a forum in which ambiguity can be resolved case by
case.
240
For example, in scrutinizing the United States' constitutional
equality norm, its low degree of legitimacy becomes evident. Not that
equality is not a desired and desirable goal both domestically and
globally. Rather,. it is that the very complex notion of equality - in-
cluding notions of sameness, of claims to impossible objections of dif-
ference, and of essentialisms conveyed by that "simple" word standing
alone - does not and cannot provide the necessary guidance to the
creation of norms, articulation of context, or the application of an
equality concept. There exists no clearly articulated set of guidelines
to influence the meaning of equality. If equality were sameness, say in
the reproductive function context or in average physical characteris-
tics context (such as height or weight), then equality for men and
234. Id. at 715-16.
235. Id. at 719.
236. Id. at 721.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 722.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 724.
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women may well be an unattainable idea - a manifestation of the de-
structive in/justice paradox. As such, local and global laws mandating
equality are at best deviant rhetorical tropes that maintain the status
quo and keep women in subordinated positions.
On the other hand, if equality means equal opportunity, full citi-
zenship, equal access to rights and benefits, and full personhood, then
the term equality, standing alone, fails to provide sufficient guidance
to its signification. Thus, the indeterminacy of the idea of legal equal-
ity permits the rule-maker or the decision-maker to ensure equality
only when s/he sees it (or only when s/he sees it as appropriate based
on her or his alpha biases). Such an indeterminate standard leaves
the door open to inequality based on the perceptions and internal
biases of the one making the judgment - perceptions and biases con-
firmed in the alpha bias unveiled in Heesacker's work as well as in
feminist critiques of law.
The challenges that the feminist legal community has faced with
respect to just what is the "right" theoretical construct to attain equal-
ity is evidence of the indeterminacy of the equality norm: Should it be
sameness? Should it be difference? Should it be relations? Should it
be power? The reality is that, depending on context, it could be same-
ness, it could be difference, it could be relations, or it could be power.
In this regard, it is plain that an appropriate rule to achieve equality
requires more than just the statement or goal of equality. There is a
need to articulate, in more detail, what equality means. Equality, as it
is presently understood, is too indeterminate a concept to constitute a
legitimate rule.
2. Symbolic Validation
[S]ymbolic validation, ritual and pedigree provide [legitimacy's]
cultural and anthropological dimension.... [T] he legitimacy of the
rule ... is to be examined in the light of its ability to communicate
[its authority]: the authority of a rule, the authority of the origina-
tor of a validating communication and, at times, the authority be-
stowed on the recipient of the communication. The
communication of authority, moreover, is symbolic rather than
literal. 241
241. Id. at 725 ("[Significantly, t]hese three concepts - symbolic validation, rit-
ual and pedigree - are related, but not identical. The symbolic validation of a rule,
or a rule-making process or institution, occurs when a signal is used as a cue to elicit
compliance with a command.").
Ritual is a specialized form of symbolic validation marked by ceremonies,
often - but not necessarily - mystical, that provide unenunciated reasons
or cues for eliciting compliance with the commands of persons or institu-
tions .... All ritual is a form of symbolic validation, but the converse is not
necessarily true. Pedigree is a different subset of cues that seek to enhance
the compliance pull of rules or rule-making institutions by emphasizing
their historical origins, their cultural or anthropological deep-rootedness.
Id. at 726.
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Rules of long standing may invite compliance. New rules, how-
ever, also invite compliance if they are widely supported. 242 Religion,
politics, and culture may create the foundation for symbolic valida-
tion. 24 3 Significantly, however,
a bad law does not become a good one for having been anointed by
parliamentary ritual and having received the blessing of pedigreed
authority .... [W]hen decisions to comply or defy are made by
those to whom a command is addressed, such cues, with their sym-
bolic validation of its legitimacy, may tip the scales on the side of
obedience. 244
Symbolic validations serve to legitimize principles, institutions, and
rules; to ensure rule compliance; and to validate exercise of power.245
In the equality context, lineage is short for it is only in recent
times that the idea of gender equality- has been embraced. 246 The
Bradwell v. Illinois24 7 Court, ruling that women could be refused admis-
sion to the practice of law, provided rich confirmation of the accept-
ance of inequality - women's and men's separate spheres. At that
stage of jurisprudential development, the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution had already been adopted. However,
the Fourteenth Amendment, in which sex/gender equality rights are
now grounded, was intended to eliminate race, not sex, discrimina-
tion; so it originally did not provide women any equality rights.248
At present, the relative universality, in theory, of the acceptance
of a norm of gender equality2 49 would tend to legitimize it. Yet, the
reality of gender inequality worldwide works against such a
conclusion. 250
Given the universal reality of women's subordinated status, it
seems that in the equality context symbolic validation is, at best, spo-
radically given; at worst, wholly absent. For example, in the United
States, there have been laws passed reinforcing the basic idea of equal-
ity, such as the equal employment laws. However, even there, dissent
from the equality norm is ample. One example was the need to spe-
cifically recognize that pregnancy is sex-related, 25 1 meaning female-
related (something that happened in the legislative framework but
242. Id. at 726-27.
243. Id. at 727.
244. Id. at 728.
245. Id. at 730.
246. See supra notes 184-202 and accompanying text.
247. 83 U.S. 130 (1872). See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (quoting the
Court's language embracing the separate spheres ideology).
248. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not grant women the right to vote).
249. See generally Universal Declaration, supra note 136; ICCPR, supra note 136;
CEDAW, supra note 138.
250. See supra Part III.C. (discussing inequality of women).
251. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976), passed to over-
turn General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that an employer's
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has not yet become a reality in the constitutional one).252 Another
example is the rejection of comparable worth strategies that would
have translated the values of skill levels from highly-paid "male" jobs
to low-paid "female" jobs in an attempt to level the field of earning
potential of the sexes. Instead, the system continues to rely on a mar-
ketplace made by men, for men, and in men's image to justify wo-
men's lesser worth.2 53 And even in the constitutional context, sex
equality has yet to become a fundamental right, the denial of which is
subject to the strictest of scrutiny.254 Rather, it is still relegated to the
toothless standard of some indeterminate ephemeral middle tier 255
creating determinacy as well as validation problems. As far as sym-
bolic validation goes, this lesser standard confirms that sex equality is
clearly not as legally important as the truly important rights. 25 6
Moreover, beyond the formal rules, civil society continues to in-
validate the "equality" - meaning anti-subordination - goals of femi-
nism, both symbolically and actually. Society as a whole still clings to
the separate spheres ideology.
Religion, via its leaders, is complicit in locating women in a differ-
ent and inferior space and, at times, in actively holding them down.
Interestingly, religion, like society as a whole, uses family as a reason
or pretext for the continuing inequality of women. In the recent ap-
ostolic letter On the Dignity of Women, Pope John Paul II echoed the
socially (and legally) dictated roles for women.2 57 Referring to wo-
men's special capacity to care for others, the Pontiff justified the con-
finement of women to their role as mothers or, in the alternative, a
life of celibacy. 258
Similarly, and even more recently, in June 1998, the Southern
Baptist Convention in Salt Lake City adopted a statement, based on a
supposed biblically-based hierarchy for the family, providing that
disability benefits plan which did not cover absences related to pregnancy was not
discriminatory).
252. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484.
253. SeeCounty of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) (discussing Con-
gress's rejection of the comparable worth doctrine).
254. The Frontiero plurality voted for strict scrutiny. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (holding that, to
justify gender-based government action, the government must demonstrate "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" for that action while noting that it was not "equating
gender classifications, for all purposes, to classifications based on race or national
origin"); but see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
255. Rush, supra note 5, at 45.
256. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197 (establishing an intermediate level of scrutiny for
classifications based on gender); see also Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977);
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
257. Excerpts From John Paul II's Apostolic Letter 'On the Dignity of Women, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1988, at Al, A6.
258. Id.
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wives are subordinate to their husbands and are their husband's help-
ers.2 59 The statement expressly provides that
[a husband] has the God-given responsibility to provide for, to pro-
tect and to lead his family. A wife is to submit herself graciously to
the servant leadership of her husband.... [She] has the God-given
responsibility to respect her husband and to serve as his helper in
managing the household and nurturing the next generation. 260
Embracing the so-called traditional, meaning gendered, family struc-
ture, the statement said marriage had to be not only monogamous but
also heterosexual. 261 Moreover, it narrowly defined the family struc-
ture to exclude widows, widowers, and single persons.2 62 Reaching be-
yond matters directly connected to the family, but nevertheless using
family as pretext, the statement rejected women in combat because it
goes against the "gender-based designation established by God and
undermines the 'male headship' in the family. '"263
These examples show that the symbolic validation of the equality
norm in the United States can be said to range from very low to non-
existent. This applies in the legal, formal rule-making, rule-enforcing,
rule-interpreting system as well as in civil society. Such a reality sup-
ports the illegitimacy of the equality norm as currently understood
and deployed in law.
3. Coherence
Coherence . . .must be understood in part as defined by factors
derived from a notion of community. Rules become coherent when
they are applied so as to preclude capricious checkerboarding.
They preclude caprice when they are applied consistently or, if in-
consistently applied, when they make distinctions based on underly-
ing general principles that connect with an ascertainable purpose of
the rules and with similar distinctions made throughout the rule
system. 2
64
Thus, when standards or rules are applied "to some but not others
equally entitled, or when the standards cease to be connected to prin-
ciples of general applicability," they are incoherent and thus
illegitimate. 265
259. Judy H. Longshaw, Church's Stance on Spouses Reaffirms, Embarrasses [sic], THE




263. Pat Gilliland, Women in Combat Shunned by Baptists, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, June
12, 1998, at 12.
264. Franck, supra note 225, at 750.
265. Id. at 738.
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There are three ways in which incoherence may lead to illegiti-
macy.2 66 Coherence means that similarly situated cases are treated
similarly. In the case of equality, coherence "undermines the stan-
dard, rules and processes bestowing status or validity. '2 67
Coherence exists "when the rule relates in a principled fashion to
other rules of the same system. '268 Incoherence, on the other hand,
"produces a checkerboard result. '269
As was shown in the discussion on symbolic validation, the appli-
cation of equality norms has resulted, at best, in an incoherent check-
erboard. Sometimes women, particularly if they are similarly situated
to men, may be treated the same as men. One example is the appar-
ent prohibition of discrimination in employment.270 Yet other times,
women, even if situated similarly to men, are nonetheless not treated
the same as men simply because of their sex. One example, which
could also be located in the context of employment, is the exclusion
of women from combat even if they are equally able to serve based on
their ability to command, to run, to shoot, or simply to survive in a
foxhole.271 Moreover, as the data in the prior sections plainly reveal,
there exists a significant disjuncture between rules mandating wo-
men's equality and women's reality of subordination and inequality.
Hence, coherence is lacking in the contemporary equality discourse
in norm formation, norm enforcement, and norm interpretation.
4. Adherence
Adherence "mean [s] the vertical nexus between a single primary
rule of obligation . . . and a pyramid of secondary rules about how
rules are made, interpreted and applied: rules, in other words, about
rules. ' 272 In essence, "[a] rule . . . is more likely to obligate if it is
made within the procedural and institutional framework of an organ-
ized community. '" 273
In the equality context, the adherence concept takes a twist.
While technically the primary rules as well as the secondary rules
about rules may have been followed, the crafters, articulators, and in-
266. Id. at 741 ("First, incoherence nullifies the flawed act of validating or with-
holding validation. Second, it undermines the standards, rules and processes for be-
stowing status or validity. Third, it derogates from the legitimacy of the institution




270. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843 (2001) (reason-
ing that plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination on the basis of sex have reme-
dies under § 7 06(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
271. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (holding Congress acted consti-
tutionally when authorizing the registration of men, and not women under the Mili-
tary Selective Service Act).
272. Franck, supra note 225, at 752.
273. Id.
[Vol. 17:111
OUT OF THE SHADOWS
terpreters of the rules have not been representative of the community.
Just looking at the composition of the original drafters, the legislature
and the judiciary, it is patent that women's voices have been absent.
Thus, while the community is developed in relation to the structure
that produces the rules, the structure has been gendered and thus has
not been representative of the community. This consequently raises
questions about its legitimacy.
In sum, the legitimacy approach, which interrogates the legiti-
macy of an established norm, combined with the discursive move-
ment274 of the New Haven School, which asks us to take a policy-
oriented approach to norm formation, provides the foundation for
developing a methodology that will pave the way for attaining wo-
men's full personhood. As the legitimacy construct cautions, the
methodology is complex. Yet, its intricacy is required for the complex
interrogation that is needed for the articulation of a construct that
will enable women's full personhood; full citizenship; and equal sta-
tus, rights and participation in society.
V. THE APPLICATION - TAKING CONTROL: BREAKING CYCLES
OF INEQUALITY
This model creates a complex framework; it demands that the
human question be part of the foundational data at every stage of any
process. This interrogation has been historically referred to as the
"woman question" which demanded the inclusion of women's voices,
concerns, needs, desires, and perspectives (varied as they may be).
Recognizing the multidimensional nature of women and women's
lives, asking the "human question" requires that there be a nonessen-
tialist, multidimensional evaluation of the impact of the scrutinized
process on any and all women. Such multidimensionality demands
that the interrogation indeed consider intersections with race, class,
religion, national or social origin, ethnicity, descent, color, class, gen-
der, and sexuality. This inquiry deconstructs the conflation of sex/
gender and all other aspects of a woman's personhood; it recognizes
and embraces the indivisibility and interdependence of women's iden-
tities. The emphasis on the various components will be dependent
upon the context of the inquiry.
The inquiries must be considered separate from, but in the con-
text of, interdependent with, and indivisible from the other pertinent
inquiries. Each query interrogates whether there are gender-specific
implications of the norm or proposed norm - particularly when it ap-
pears to be neutral or objective. Such analysis will ensure that identi-
fied causal links between gender and a particular outcome are
accurate and relevant to the issue being considered. The analysis will
274. See JUERGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY
178-79 (T. McCarthy trans., 1979) (emphasizing the role of discursive validation of
law).
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ascertain whether the elements requisite to legitimate norm creation
exist. It will account for the multiplicity of coexisting factors that re-
flect the multidimensionality of women's lives.
The common thread of each inquiry, of course, is to make wo-
men visible and raise their voices so that their needs are met and their
rights are respected and fulfilled worldwide. In this regard, there has
to be an acceptance that in order to raise women's voices a discursive
process of communication that includes women is necessary. Regard-
less of who the ultimate decision-maker is, the process must include
and integrate the views of those who are the subjects and the objects
of the process, from whom expectations are being generated by the
process. Women's perspectives must be part of the deliberations.
The ultimate legitimacy of the process itself will depend upon the con-
sent of the people and the recognition and acceptance of the opinion
of the people. The people include women.
This leads to the logical need for women's participation in any
process, participation that must be holistic. Women must participate
as both the inquired about and the inquirers, permitting discourse on
the translations and interpretations from women's perspectives. Only
with women's presence and perspectives in, for example, the
processes of government and governing will women's concerns and
issues become an integral part of, and incorporated into, the human
rights processes and the global rights agenda. Many of the gendered
shortcomings of the human rights model can be attributed to the ex-
clusion of women from participation in the global processes and
institutions.
With respect to any factor that can be a tool of imperialism or of
gender oppression under the guise of neutrality, a balancing test is in
order. Culture is one such factor; social normativity is another. To
evaluate any perceived or claimed conflict between a cultural practice
or social norm and a right, one must first obtain information about
the cultural practice/social norm from both an insider's (a proponent
of the practice/norm) and an outsider's (one claiming the practice/
norm effects a deprivation of rights) perspective. Similarly, the
claimed human rights deprivation must be examined from an insider
and an outsider perspective.
In this regard, particular attention to cultural practices/social
norms is necessary so that they may be carefully protected from the
improper imposition of outsiders' ideologies. On the other hand,
neither culture nor social normativity should be allowed as a pretext
to shield practices/norms that perpetuate women's subordination. In
examining a cultural practice or social norm that appears to disadvan-
tage only women, or to have a disproportionately burdensome or dele-
terious impact on women, the harms of violating the human rights
norm must be weighed against the benefit of the cultural practice/
social norm. Several useful inquiries to guide in creation of legitimate
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equality norms and to assist in the evaluation of existing ones include
the following which assist in detailing gendered consequences:
" What is the origin and value of the cultural practice/social norm?
" What is the nature of the practice/norm being challenged?
* Is there a uniform interpretation of the source and nature of the
practice/norm?
" Who is challenging the practice/norm (an insider? an outsider?
an oppressed person within the insider community whose status
renders her an "other"?)?
" What are the challenger's motives in opposing the practice/
norm?
" What are the claimed harmful outcomes of the practice/norm?
* What is the level of significance of the practice/norm within the
community?
* What is the level of intrusion of the practice/norm on protected
individual/group rights?
" What is the level of significance of the protected right to the
community?
It is beyond dispute that a broad range of cultural practices and
social norms exist that may interfere with women's attainment of full
personhood. 275 The proposed methodology is one in which all per-
spectives are represented and considered in the conversations about
rights. Women's participation and representation will safeguard
against the "tyranny of the majority" - ensure that the powerful,
meaning male, entities do not use culture or other accepted social
norms as a sword to eviscerate harmless (even if gendered) cultural/
social traditions and that such traditions are not used as a shield
against accountability for negating women's full complement of
rights. This is particularly significant because all women live in a
world where gendered cultural prejudices have constituted the formu-
lation of law.
The proposed blueprint for analysis should be useful in any con-
text that has an impact on women - whether it be gathering or inter-
preting data; creating, applying or interpreting norms; designing
programs or projects; or drafting documents. The developed model
effects much needed reform to render women full citizens of their
global and local communities. The new paradigm seeks to remedy the
gendered (and racialized) deficiencies in the existing policies, rules,
and social contexts, as well as to bridge the schism between women's
realities and the nondiscrimination and substantive entitlement rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
A process that embraces the discursive approach and analyzes
norms and practices (or proposed norms and practices) to ascertain
their legitimacy develops a feminist methodology to fit the complex
275. See supra notes 173-177, 180-182, and accompanying text.
2002]
WISCONSIN WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL
location of women in society around the world. As this essay has
shown, no one feminist theory has succeeded in creating a paradigm
that can serve to eradicate women's subordinated status in all their
myriad locations in law and life. At first blush, application of the legit-
imacy model offered as an explanation for the failure of any single
theoretical model's success that the word "equality" is insufficient to
attain full personhood for women. The legitimacy analysis did, how-
ever, reveal that the policy of equality can be embraced in society as it
has been in law on paper. In order to evaluate what an adequate pol-
icy of equality might be, legitimacy theory, combined with communi-
cation theory, tells us to engage in a complex series of inquiries to
ascertain the source of and reason for women's second-class citizen-
ship - a location often justified by traditional and cultural construc-
tions of gender roles.
Because of the complexity of the concept of equality, there can
be no simple solution, no one-size-fits-all theoretical model. It is not
sufficient to have the answer pot all ready and then simply add sex
and stir. Rather, a complex interrogation of the contextual framework
is the only approach that can eventually lead to a legitimate - mul-
tidimensional and culturally sensitive - perspective. These questions
will pave the path for legitimate norms - norms that are determinate
because they have input from and thus consent of those governed by
the rules, which will, in turn, result in adherence to the norms. More
importantly, the norms themselves will have considered women's
voices, their locations, their needs, their strengths, and their weak-
nesses because, notwithstanding their differences - be they real or
imagined - from the normative male model, women are still entitled
to full citizenship.
A legitimate concept of equality will allow the transformation of
women's position. Following this inclusive methodology, one that
specifically articulates points of inquiry concerning locations of sub-
ordination and reveals the illegitimacy of the existing approaches,
provides the starting point to ensure that women attain full
personhood.
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